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
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
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**THE ARMED FORCES CODE OF CONDUCT
AN EXAMINATION OF ITS SUITABILITY
APPLICATION IN THE VIETNAM WAR
IN FUTURE ARMED CONFLICTS**

Student Research Report No. 134

**James L. Lamar - Colonel, U.S. Air Force
Raymond J. Merritt - Colonel, U.S. Air Force
Robert R. Sawhill, Jr. - Colonel, U.S. Air Force**

INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES
Washington, D. C.

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Class of 1974

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ABSTRACT OF STUDENT RESEARCH REPORT**

NAME(S) LAMAR, James L., Colonel, USAF MERRITT, Raymond J., Colonel, USAF SAWHILL, Robert R., Jr., Colonel, USAF	REPORT NO. <u>134</u> DATE: _____ TITLE: The Armed Forces Code of Conduct: An Examination of its Suitability & Application in the Vietnam War & in Future Armed Conflicts
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ABSTRACT

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The return from captivity of all prisoners of war known to have been held by the Vietnamese Communists brought a renewal of the oft-revived outcry against the Armed Forces Code of Conduct. Every brutal act, every instance of suffering and deprivation by Americans in the cells and cages of Hanoi and the Vietcong, was attributed to the Code by its detractors. Yet, the very men who had to exist under the Code spoke out strongly, even passionately, in favor of retention of this military standard of conduct in time of combat or captivity. Why? This paper answers that question, through a thorough examination of the Code-related experiences of these men. Research into these experiences reveals two facts about which there hitherto was only conjecture. First, the basic intention of the most controversial clause of the Code--Article V--was misinterpreted and misapplied by two of the three Services. Second, the Code proved to be of outstanding value to captured Americans in Vietnam, in spite of the systematic efforts of their captors to force these men to violate each of its provisions. Yet, there are deficiencies in the Code. Specific recommendations are made in the final chapter concerning changes in the Code to correct these deficiencies.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Introduction

A Code of Conduct applicable to all members of the armed forces of the United States was promulgated on August 17, 1955, by Dwight D. Eisenhower, President of the United States.¹ The Code, which is composed of six separate-subject articles, exhorts all service personnel to ". . . oppose mentally, physically, and morally all efforts of the enemy against themselves, their fellow servicemen, and their country during peacetime, combat, or captivity."² In November 1955, the Department of Defense published DOD Pamphlet 8-1³ to alert the Services to the Code and its intentions.

Between the promulgation of the Code in 1955 and the publication of DOD Directive 1300.7 in 1964 there was no

¹U.S., Office of the President, Executive Order No. 10631 (Washington, D.C., August 17, 1955), hereinafter referred to as the Code.

²U.S., Department of Defense, Directive 1300.7, Training and Education Measures to Support the Code of Conduct (Washington, D.C., July 8, 1964).

³U.S., Department of Defense, The U.S. Fighting Man's Code, DOD PAM 8-1, DA PAM 21-71, AFP 34-10-1 (Washington, D.C., November 1955).

opportunity to ascertain or evaluate the relevancy of the Code. However, by July 1964, American servicemen increasingly were becoming involved in combat in South Vietnam. Ostensibly, they were advisors to the armed forces of the Republic of Vietnam. Actually, they were fighting side-by-side with the beleaguered South Vietnamese. In fact, several Americans were missing in action, and some were known to be prisoners of the VC.⁴

Would these Americans be able to uphold the high standards of the Code? There was controversy over this subject, mainly in relation to Article V:

When questioned, should I become a prisoner of war, I am bound to give only name, rank, service number, and date of birth. I will evade answering further questions to the utmost of my ability. I will make no statements disloyal to my country and its allies or harmful to their cause.

It was argued, even in 1955,⁵ immediately after the Code was published, that this article was too unrealistic, too spartan, and too unobtainable in today's real world. But others believed that Article V only reiterates what is expected of an American and is ". . . so traditional that every American should automatically be

⁴VC--Vietcong; an acronym commonly applied to Vietnamese Communist guerrillas fighting in South Vietnam.

⁵Editorials from 43 newspapers and 1 periodical, published in 37 cities in 26 states within the first 4 days after the promulgation of the Code; from the Memorandum of Information published by the Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War, August 26, 1955.

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aware of it."⁶ It was to reaffirm this latter view as the basic policy of the armed forces of the United States that the Department of Defense published Directive 1300.7, on July 8, 1964.

Less than thirty days later, the first American military forces became involved in the Vietnam War,⁷ and the first American pilot was captured in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam).⁸ This was the beginning of the longest and, in many ways, the most agonizing war in American history--a war in which American prisoners of war (POWs) played a far greater part than in any other war.

It was not until early-1969 that the first large group of American servicemen who were subject to the provisions of the Code were released from captivity by an enemy. Ironically, these men had not been engaged in combat. They were crew members of the U.S.S. Pueblo and were captured with their ship in international waters off the coast of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea(North Korea). These officers and men of the United States Navy were accused by their North Korean captors of being spies and were held over a year. The stories they related of their attempts to abide by the Code, particularly

⁶U.S., Department of the Navy, NAVPERS 15922, Effective Naval Leadership and the Code of Conduct (Washington, D.C., November 1958).

⁷The Tonkin Gulf incident, August 4 and 5, 1964.

⁸Everett Alvarez, LtJG, USN, captured on August 5, 1964.

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Article V, and the subsequent mistreatment, were almost beyond belief.⁹ Once more, as in 1955 and in 1964, an appeal to modify or eliminate the Code was voiced. Among other notables who spoke out against the Code, Admiral Arleigh Burke, a retired Chief of Naval Operations, stated in a television interview,

You can put enough pressure on any man to break him. (There is) some merit in the Government issuing a command saying there is no Code of Conduct.¹⁰

On April 28, 1969, the U.S.S. Pueblo Subcommittee¹¹ reported, in its findings from the investigation of the Pueblo incident:

The Subcommittee is of a view that the Code of Conduct does require some revision and clarification The Subcommittee appreciates the reluctance of the Department of Defense and the individual Service Departments to modify the Code of Conduct until after the repatriation of our Prisoners of War in North Vietnam.¹²

Finally, the long American involvement in Vietnam ended, in early 1973. As stipulated in the Paris Accords of January 27, all American combat forces were out of South Vietnam within two months after the agreements were signed.

⁹"The Proud Men of the Pueblo," The Reader's Digest, June 1969, p. 58.

¹⁰"The Code of Conduct--An ABC White Paper," ABC-TV (New York: February 17, 1969).

¹¹U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, 91st Cong., 1st and 2d sess., 1969-70.

¹²U.S., Congress, House, Report of the Activities of the House Committee on Armed Services, 91st Cong., 1st and 2d sess., 1969-70 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970), p. F14286, par. 7.

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Within the same period, the North Vietnamese and the VC released all American prisoners of war (POWs) known to have been held, plus at least one other not known to have been held.¹³ Of the 591 POWs who were released, 25 were civilians captured in South Vietnam during the 1968 Tet offensive. All of the remaining 566 POWs were members of the U.S. armed forces--mostly officers. They had been trained to varying degrees in all aspects of the Code. The vast majority of these men had tried to abide by the Code, even after they had been broken one or more times through torture.

The release of the POWs was effected in four separate groups of approximately equal numbers, timed to coincide with the withdrawal of American troops from South Vietnam. Pursuant to agreements worked out among themselves prior to the first incremental release, the POWs in the first three groups refrained from commenting on their treatment, to avoid jeopardizing the release of those still held prisoner. But, after the release on March 29, 1973, of the last group of POWs that the North Vietnamese and VC claimed to be holding, the entire group of POWs began individually to relate the true and terrible story of their captivity. A wave of public indignation swept the country, against the VC, against the North Vietnamese--and against the Code. Private citizens, public officials, news commentators--

¹³Floyd J. Thompson, Maj., USA, captured in South Vietnam on March 13, 1964.

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all sorts of Americans--began once again to question whether or not the Code should be eliminated, or at least modified to allow captured service personnel sufficient latitude to avoid being tortured.

Partly in answer to this renewed outcry against the Code, the Department of Defense directed, in January 1974, the establishment of a study group to evaluate the Vietnam POW experience.¹⁴

This thesis will add the research efforts and the personal views of the writers to the work of that study group.

Statement of the Research Question

This paper examines the Code of Conduct, in part and as a whole, in relation to its role in the Vietnam conflict. The objective is to answer conclusively the primary research question:

Is the Code a viable standard of conduct for American military personnel in combat or in captivity, or should it be changed--and, if so, how?

Derivation of the Subsidiary Questions

Analysis of the primary research question suggests some other questions which should be addressed. In subsequent chapters, four subsidiary questions are answered:

¹⁴Robert C. Taber, O/ASD, letter, "Evaluation of Experiences under the Code of Conduct" (Washington, D. C.: Department of Defense, O/ASD, January 9, 1974).

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1. Why was the Code formulated, and what were the intentions of its writers?
2. Was training in the Code adequate before and during the Vietnam conflict?
3. Was the Code valuable, or detrimental, to Americans who lived under it as POWs in Vietnam?
4. Are there deficiencies in the Code and in Code-related activities?

Significance of the Report

This paper combines the POW experiences and deep-seated convictions of the writers¹⁵ with those of a large majority of their fellow POWs. The greatest part of this paper is derived from the shared experiences and similar views of these men.

The objectives of the Code are to protect, beyond any reasonable doubt, the cause of freedom and democracy for which the United States stands, and to strive for the greatest possibility of survival for all those who serve that cause.¹⁶

Who better can testify to the accomplishment of the stated objectives of the Code than those men who existed under the Code during prolonged periods of severe stress?

It is the considered and collective opinion of the writers that any study undertaken either by the Department of Defense

¹⁵The writers were POWs in North Vietnam for extended periods of time:

Colonel Merritt--7 years, 5 months
Colonel Lamar--6 years, 9 months
Colonel Sawhill--5 years, 7 months

¹⁶U.S., DON, NAVPERS 15922, Effective Naval Leadership, p. 3, n. 6.

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or the individual Services would be incomplete without taking into account the first-hand knowledge of these men. There are, for example, several other studies, reports, and theses currently being written on the Code.¹⁷ Each of these papers examines the Code from a different angle. All of them, therefore, should be of value to the Defense Department Study Group in its consideration of the Code.

Research Sources and Materials

In researching for this paper, the writers have used both primary and secondary sources of information. A portion of the primary information is derived from the personal experiences of the writers. Additionally, other American POWs of the Vietnam conflict have been interviewed by the writers for useful information from their experiences. The remaining primary information comes from a survey of all POWs¹⁸ conducted by a Special Study Group composed of thirty-nine Vietnam POWs

¹⁷These include, but are not limited to, the efforts of: Captain (RAdm. -selectee) William P. Lawrence, USN, National War College '74; Colonel Samuel R. Johnson, USAF, National War College '74; Colonel Benjamin Purcell, USA, Army War College '74; Commander Raymond Vohden, USN, Industrial College of the Armed Forces '74; Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth North, USAF, and associates, Naval War College '74; Major Willford Abbott, USAF, Armed Forces Staff College '74; and the POW Study Group (39 former POWs), Air War College, '74.

¹⁸See Appendix 2, "Survey of Returned Prisoners of War," John P. Flynn, Letter to all returned POWs, Air War College, Air University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 36112, December 12, 1973; hereinafter referred to as the "Survey."

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presently attending the Air War College at Maxwell Air Force Base (AFB), Montgomery, Alabama. To avoid duplication of effort, the writers of this thesis coordinated with the POW Special Study Group on the formulation of the questionnaire used in the "Survey." All of the questions pertinent to the subject of this paper have been included in the questionnaire, and the writers have been provided a statistical printout of the results.¹⁹ Secondary sources of material include the files of the Department of Defense, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Library of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and the Library of Congress.

Assumptions

The writers have made these assumptions in research for and writing of this paper:

1. There will be future armed conflicts involving American military personnel. Most likely, such conflicts will find Americans pitted against armed forces of Communist countries, or forces which have been instigated, trained, and led by Communist cadres.
2. There will be some form of a published standard to guide the conduct of American military personnel while fighting or during captivity.
3. There will be American POWs in future armed conflicts. Their captors will attempt to exploit them for military information and for propaganda.
4. The Communists will examine and evaluate the experience of the Vietnamese in handling

¹⁹Ibid.

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American POWs, in preparation for similar situations in the future. Any revision of the Code must take this factor into account and must provide a realistic standard for American military personnel in combat or captivity.

Scope and Limitation of the Paper

This thesis focuses on the experiences of American POWs in the recent Vietnam conflict in relation to the requirements of the Code of Conduct. Taking into account their views, it establishes the usefulness of the Code in that conflict, and whether the Code as presently written continues to be a viable standard of conduct for American fighting men. The final chapter offers recommendations concerning possible changes or suitable alternatives to the Code.

This paper does not address these areas:

1. Sensitive or classified information.
2. Individual cases of alleged misconduct of POWs, on a by-name basis.

Organization of the Paper

Chapter II of this paper brings into historical focus the need for the Code, the reasons why it was structured and written in its present form, and the purpose it is intended to serve.

Chapter III discusses the type and method of training provided by each Service to its members, to insure their

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knowledge and understanding of the Code, prior to and during the Vietnam conflict.

Chapter IV is devoted to Code-related experiences of returned POWs, including those of the writers of this paper. This chapter reports and analyzes the written and statistical results of the "Survey. "

Chapter V discusses deficiencies in the Code and in Code-related activities.

Chapter VI contains a summary, followed by the conclusions and recommendations of the writers.

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CHAPTER II

AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Introduction

This chapter brings into historical focus the reasons for the formulation of the Code and what it was intended to accomplish. Special attention is paid to the underlying motives and intentions of the writers of the Code, particularly as regards the controversial Article V.¹ For these reasons, the chapter is organized into several sections.

Following the statement of the subsidiary question, there is a brief discussion of the evolution of the treatment of captives. This includes a resume of the American POW experience in the Korean conflict since that experience was the catalyst for the development of the Code. Following this resume is the story of that development--how the Code came to be.

Statement of the Subsidiary Question

A thoughtful consideration of the primary research question concerning the viability of the Code in the future

¹Supra, p. 2.

suggests the need for a look into the past. This chapter answers the subsidiary question:

Why was the Code formulated, and what were the intentions of its writers?

Early Treatment of Captives

The question of what to do with captives during war-time has been a problem as long as there have been wars. In the very earliest days of recorded history, captives were among the spoils which went to the victors. Normally, they either were executed ceremonially or disposed of as human sacrifices to the gods.²

As the world became more civilized and industrialized, it was apparent that large labor forces were needed to accomplish the manual tasks related to this industrialization. With this need came the realization that captives, as slaves, could perform much of the required labor. This marked the beginning of the end of torture and extermination of captives in this period, as the bartering of slaves became an important source of profit.

The pendulum of captive treatment throughout history has swung from one extreme to the other. As the Roman Empire ended and the Dark Ages began, it swung back toward the barbaric side. But, near the end of the Middle Ages, it appeared to

²Kenneth A. McGaw, "Prisoners of War," Encyclopedia Americana, 1966, vol. XXII, p. 604.

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reverse course as captives began to receive slightly better treatment than in the Dark Ages. This can be attributed to a reawakening of captors to the realization of the monetary value of prisoners. A system of ransoming of captives evolved, and definite scales of payment were established. In some cases, distinguished captives were exchanged for hostages. Throughout the Middle Ages, captives generally were considered to be unfortunate victims of the conflict and were treated somewhat more humanely.³

The Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, which ended the Thirty Years War, signaled a new era in the philosophy concerning captives. Agreements were concluded which shifted the responsibility for care of captives from the combat units to the belligerent States, and which specified repatriation of prisoners with ransom.⁴ The result was a trend toward more humane treatment of captives, until World War I. But, in spite of numerous international agreements on this subject,⁵ there were instances of inhumane treatment recorded during this period. There were even cases of torture, mainly to obtain military intelligence from the captive.

³Ibid.

⁴William E. S. Flory, Prisoners of War (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Public Affairs, 1942), p. 15.

⁵e.g., Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907.

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During World War I, there was a reversal in the trend toward better treatment of prisoners. This regression was the result of the harsh conditions of the war. As noted above, deliberate mistreatment of prisoners was to obtain military intelligence.

In World War II, treatment of prisoners of war ranged from barbaric to benign. However, for the first time, a new element appeared--the beginning of indoctrination programs and experimental medical programs. The Germans experimented with many of their prisoners for medical purposes, and with others in attempts to change their basic beliefs. The latter efforts largely were unsuccessful, mainly because the Nazis ". . . insisted on posing as a superior race to the other belligerents."⁶ However, the Germans did have a highly successful interrogation program. They were able to extract considerable amounts of intelligence information from captured prisoners, particularly aircrews. "Threats of military trials were part of the psychology of the interrogation used to obtain intelligence information."⁷

The Japanese were much more direct and cruel than the Germans in the treatment of their captives. Early efforts at

⁶R. C. Hingorani, Prisoners of War (Bombay, India: Tripathy Private Ltd., 1963), p. 117.

⁷Prisoners of War (Washington, D.C.: Institute of World Policy, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, 1948), p. 27.

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indoctrination were unsuccessful. The brutal treatment and the high death rate are indicative of the minimal value of prisoners to the Japanese.

Many were shot, decapitated, drowned, killed by forced marches, died from forced labor in the tropical heat, or died from lack of medical attention. Also, many aviators were killed without trial.⁸

American Prisoners of War During the Korean Conflict

Treatment of American POWs during the Korean conflict was extremely harsh and brutal. Hundreds of POWs died in forced marches, while hundreds more succumbed to the starvation diet, to disease, and to the rigors of the frigid North Korean winters. All told, some 38 percent, or 2,730, of the 7,190 Americans captured in Korea died in captivity. This compares with 10.9 percent of the 129,701 U.S. POWs in World War II and 3.57 percent of the 4,120 captured members of the American Expeditionary Force in World War I who died in captivity. There were some escapes of American POWs in Korea, both during the forced marches and from the POW camps. However, the only escapes which were successful were those that occurred before the POW reached the prison camp.⁹

⁸Helen B. Shaffer, "Treatment of Prisoners of War," Editorial Research Reports (Washington, D.C., 1967), vol. II, p. 511.

⁹Edward Hunter, Communist Psychological Warfare (Brainwashing), Committee on Un-American Activities, Hearings (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1958), p. 3.

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The Korean conflict proved to be a turning point in the history of prisoners of war. For the first time, the existence and treatment of American POWs were dependent upon their propaganda value to their North Korean and Chinese Communist captors. For the first time, American POWs became pawns in the hands of a regime whose ideology dictates the life-long adherence of its proponents to a new kind of struggle:

Total War for the Minds of Men

America must view the Communist treatment of captives as but another weapon in the world-wide war for the minds of men. The nation must recognize the duplicity of an enemy which pays no more than lip service to the Geneva Conventions.

However, the United States cannot oppose duplicity with a similar policy. To do so might be fighting fire with fire. But the United States refuses to sacrifice principle for expediency. Such a justification of means for end would mean the abandonment of the cause for which America fights. The national conscience would revolt at such a solution.

The nation must continue to oppose Communism, or any other threat to Democracy, with American weapons and principles. The machines of war are assured by American enterprise, science and industry. The principles, home-forged by America's founders, are more than an heirloom heritage for showcase display. They are precepts which must be practiced if the nation is to remain the guardian of man's liberties that it is.

The responsibility for the maintenance and preservation of the United States and all it stands for is one which must be shared by every citizen. Every American is in the front line in the war for the minds of men.¹⁰

¹⁰U. S., Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War, POW: The Fight Continues after the Battle (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, August 1955), p. 31.

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How the Code Came To Be¹¹

The roots of the Code stretch all the way back to feudal times, when the knight or warrior was called upon to assume the obligations of noblesse oblige. He was pledged to remain true to his lord or king, in battle or in captivity. If he were ransomed and later found to have committed treason, such as giving information to his captors about his own forces, he would be severely punished. During the Crusades, an unwritten rule evolved in regard to prisoner interrogation. The captive knight, to facilitate release through ransom, was permitted to divulge only his "name and rank" to his captors. This rule has carried forward to modern times and has become both the most basic and the most controversial part of the Code of Conduct of the Armed Forces of the United States.

The concept gradually emerged in the 17th and 18th centuries that captives were the responsibility of the capturing sovereign or State, rather than of the individuals or units that did the capturing. And, the right of the captor over the prisoner theoretically was limited to preventing him from returning to his own side and taking up arms again. However, no international agreements ever were formalized to this effect.

Some important concepts concerning prisoner conduct surfaced during the American Revolutionary War. In an

¹¹All of the facts and quotations in this section (unless otherwise footnoted) were derived from: Ibid., chs. I-III.

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effort to discourage desertions, the death penalty was established for those American prisoners who, after capture, took up arms in the service of the enemy. Duress or coercion was recognized as mitigating evidence, in such cases, only when the individual had been threatened with immediate death.¹²

The question of prisoner conduct assumed added importance during and as a result of the American Civil War. To prevent wholesale surrenders by men eager to obtain parole and evade further military service, the War Department decreed that it was the duty of a prisoner of war to escape.¹³ That same year, President Lincoln showed his concern for the plight of captives when he asked a noted academician, Professor Francis Lieber, to develop a code for the humane treatment of prisoners of war. As a consequence, the rule was established:

Honorable men, when captured, will abstain from giving to the enemy information concerning their own army, and the modern law of war permits no longer the use of any violence against prisoners, in order to obtain the desired information, or to punish them for having given false information.

Professor Lieber's Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States undoubtedly were the first comprehensive codification of international law issued by a government.

¹²See case study, "Respublica vs. M'Carty," 1781; W. E. S. Flory, Prisoners of War: A Study in the Development of International Law (Washington, D. C.: American Council on Public Affairs, 1942), p. 15.

¹³U. S., War Department, General Order No. 207 (Washington, D. C., July 1863).

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They were based on moral precepts which recognized the enemy as a fellow human with lawful rights, and specified:

No belligerent has the right to declare that he will treat every captured man in arms . . . as a brigand or a bandit.

A prisoner is subject to no punishment for being a public enemy, nor is any revenge wreaked upon him by the intentional infliction of any suffering, or disgrace, by cruel imprisonment, want of food, by mutilation, death, or any other barbarity.

A prisoner of war remains answerable for his crimes committed before the captor's army or people, (for crimes) committed before he was captured, and for which he has not been punished by his own authorities. A prisoner of war . . . is a prisoner of the government and not of the captor.

Prisoners of war are subject to confinement or imprisonment such as may be deemed necessary on account of safety, but they are to be subjected to no other intentional suffering or indignity.

A prisoner of war who escapes may be shot, or otherwise killed in flight: but neither death nor any other punishment shall be inflicted on him for his attempt to escape, which the law of order does not consider a crime. Stricter means of security shall be used after an unsuccessful attempt at escape. Every captured wounded man shall be medically treated according to the ability of the medical staff.

In a way, Professor Lieber's code has come full circle. It was the basis for the prisoner-relief code formulated in the Brussels Conference of 1874 which, in turn, strongly influenced the first Hague Conference of 1899, which influenced the second Hague Conference of 1907. The results of these two conferences became the foundation of both the 1929 and 1949 Geneva Conventions--and from the latter was developed the present-day Armed Forces Code of Conduct, which had its genesis in the POW camps of North Korea.

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During the early days of the Korean conflict, most of the publicity concerning those Americans who were being held captive by the North Koreans and later by the Chinese Communists focused upon the aspect of barbaric treatment. This was mainly a continuation of the public and official concern about POWs which has surfaced during previous wars.

Almost universally, the major implication seen in past wars, other than the necessity of defeating so barbarous a foe, was the need for the development and enforcement of principles of international law for the protection of the prisoner of war against mistreatment and degradation. Above all, this included protection against coercion, impressment, and other pressures inducing him to act disloyally.¹⁴

As time went on, this concern for the plight of Americans held by their Communist captors began to change. Instances of alleged misconduct began to appear in the American press. These allegations concerned acts that amounted to treason, desertion to the enemy, mistreatment of fellow prisoners of war, and similar crimes; consequently, they were well publicized.¹⁵

¹⁴Albert D. Biderman, March to Calumny (New York: MacMillan, 1963), pp. 17, 18.

¹⁵See, e.g., George S. Prugh, Jr., "Justice for All Recap-K's," Armed Combat Forces Journal (November 1955), p. 15; "Week by Week, the Prisoners," The Commonwealth 59, October 16, 1953, p. 28; "Week by Week, Exchange of Prisoners," The Commonwealth 58, August 21, 1953, p. 479; Hotchner, "They Were Not Brainwashed," New York Herald Tribune, July 17, 1955, sec. 7, p. 7; Krock, "In the Nation," New York Times, April 16, 1953, p. 7, col. 6; Lucey, "US Fears Confessions of POWs," Washington Daily News, April 4, 1953; Palmer, "The War for the POWs' Minds," New York Times, September 13, 1953, sec. 6, p. 13; Shearer, "Teaching GIs to Withstand

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The reasons for these cases of alleged misconduct were varied.

A prisoner of either the North Koreans or the Chinese was encouraged to look to the detaining authorities as a source of leadership. There were several results. In some cases, there was a breakdown of internal discipline among the prisoners, and, following this, a weakening of the chain of command. Frequently, too, a condition of mutual distrust became the norm rather than the exception among POWs. As morale dropped, mutual assistance among POWs lessened. This in part accounts for the larger percentage of deaths among prisoners during the Korean War.¹⁶

The decline of morale had three effects. First, was the failure of POWs to care for their fellows. Second, was the loss on the part of the individual of the will to maintain his identity as an American fighting man. Third, was the loss of the will to struggle for survival. These effects were cumulative--when the third stage was reached, death resulted almost inevitably and usually without perceptible cause.

The widespread publicity heightened public concern not only for the treatment accorded American POWs, but also for the reasons underlying the incidents of misconduct. Answers were sought, through investigations, boards of inquiry, and courts martial. It was discovered that a shocking one-third of

Communist Brainwashing, " Washington Post, July 11, 1954; Christian Science Monitor, April 20, 1953, p. 1, col. 4.

¹⁶Edmund J. Cannon, The Code of Conduct; Basic Questions Regarding its Applicability to Contemporary Prisoner of War Experience (Washington, D. C.: Congressional Research Service, January 12, 1970), p. 3.

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American POWs in Korea collaborated with their Communist captors, either as informers or as propagandists. And of these collaborators, an even more shocking twenty-one Americans refused repatriation, choosing instead to live in Communist China. The shame of this collective act of treason lives on in the hearts and minds of patriotic Americans--the trauma not lessened by the fact that each of these "turncoats" eventually had a change of heart and returned to the United States. Among the POWs who were repatriated, 192 men were found to be chargeable with serious offenses against their fellow prisoners, or their country, or both. As of 1956, five officers and nine enlisted men had been tried for offenses alleged to have been committed in the POW camps of North Korea. Three were acquitted and eleven were convicted.¹⁷ These trials stimulated even more public interest in the Korean War experience. As a result:

. . . on August 7, 1954, the Secretary of Defense directed that a committee be formed . . . to recommend a suitable approach for conducting a comprehensive study of the problems concerning the behavior of military personnel while in a prisoner of war status. The work of this group resulted in the appointment by the Secretary of Defense, on May 17, 1955, of the Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War.¹⁸

¹⁷George S. Prugh, Jr., "The Code of Conduct for the Armed Forces," Columbia Law Review, LVI (April 1956), p. 679.

¹⁸Ibid., hereinafter referred to as the Committee.

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The Committee drew up a number of position papers on the subject of POW behavior. One of these papers developed into the Code of Conduct as it is today.

What the Code of Conduct Was
Meant to Accomplish

The U.S. Fighting Man's Code of Conduct, according to S. L. A. Marshall,¹⁹ was designed to prevent the recurrence of the type of misconduct on the part of American POWs that took place during the Korean Conflict. But, how the Code was intended by its writers to accomplish this monumental task, and how it has been interpreted and applied in the years since its promulgation, are two radically different things.

A large part of the perennial controversy over the Code has been caused by the Spartan interpretation of Article V²⁰ by two of the three Services. During the discussions which ebbed and flowed around the drafting of the Code, the wording ". . . I am bound to give only name, rank, service number, and date of birth." caused serious concern as to future interpretation. But, since Article V was derived from the 1949 Geneva Conventions on treatment of prisoners of war, the Acting Chairman of the

¹⁹S. L. A. Marshall, "The Pueblo and the Code," The New Leader, April 14, 1969, p. 10.

²⁰"When questioned, should I become a prisoner of war, I am bound to give only name, rank, service number, and date of birth. I will evade answering further questions to the utmost of my ability. I will make no oral or written statements disloyal to my country and its allies or harmful to their cause."

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Committee expressed the belief that the Code should quote the Convention verbatim, and that training guidance then being drafted simultaneously with the Code would ensure universal understanding of the intentions of the Committee.²¹ That training guidance was contained in the pamphlet published by the Committee immediately after the promulgation of the Code in August 1955. As stated in the instructional material accompanying Article V:

When questioned, a prisoner of war is required by the Geneva Convention and permitted by this Code to disclose his name, rank, service number, and date of birth. A prisoner of war may also communicate with the enemy regarding his individual health or welfare as a prisoner of war and, when appropriate, on routine matters of camp administration.²²

This excerpt makes it clear to even a casual reader that the Committee intended for the POW to have some latitude in dealing with his captors. But, of the three Services, only the Air Force consistently has taught the Code in its survival school as the Committee intended it to be used. One of the greatest needs in relation to the Code is that it be taught and applied consistently throughout the Department of Defense.

But the Department of Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War had another, much broader, objective in mind as they painstakingly put together the Code:

²¹Marshall, "The Pueblo."

²²U.S., Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War, POW: The Fight, p. 40.

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Code of American Conduct

The battlefield of modern warfare is all inclusive. Today there are no distant front lines, remote no man's lands, far-off rear areas. The home front is but an extension of the fighting front. In the dreaded event of another all-out war--a thermo-nuclear war--the doorstep may become the Nation's first line of defense. Under such circumstances, the new code of conduct for the American serviceman might well serve the American citizen.²³

²³Ibid., p. 31.

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CHAPTER III

ADEQUACY OF TRAINING IN THE CODE OF CONDUCT BEFORE AND DURING THE VIETNAM WAR

Introduction

Every member of the Armed Forces of the United States is expected to measure up to the standards embodied in the Code of Conduct while he is in combat or captivity. To insure achievement of these standards, each member of the armed forces liable to capture shall be provided with specific training and instructions designed to better equip him to counter and withstand all enemy efforts against him, and shall be fully instructed as to the behavior and obligations expected of him during combat or captivity.

The Secretary of Defense . . . shall take such action as is deemed necessary to implement this order and to disseminate and make known the said code to all members of the Armed Forces of the United States.¹

The earliest publication issued by the Department of Defense concerning the Code was The U.S. Fighting Man's Code² followed by Department of Defense Directive 1300.7. From these publications and directives, the individual services established the programs they felt necessary to fulfill the requirements for Code training.

¹U.S., President, Executive Order No. 10631, p. 1, n. 1.

²DOD PAM 8-1, p. 1, n. 3.

Yet, it should not be necessary, and even may not be possible, to give instruction on some of the principles contained in the Code. For instance, how can one teach such nebulous high-sounding statements as contained in Article VI³ without the learner having the proper life-style background to enable him to develop the necessary moral and ethical fiber from within? Is it the task of the military to accomplish that psychological conditioning? It is not intended in this study to launch into that particular aspect of the training of the individual. Rather, the discussion in this chapter centers on what was taught to the serviceman in the past about the Code. The objective is to evaluate whether training was adequate for the task that many later faced both in combat and in the prison camps of Vietnam.

Statement of the Subsidiary Question

The following subsidiary question is addressed in this chapter:

Was training in the Code of Conduct adequate before and during the Vietnam War?

This comparative analysis includes a review of Code training in general. More specifically, it examines the training required in conjunction with the broader Survival, Evasion,

³See Appendix 1, "The Code of Conduct."

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Resistance and Escape (SERE) Training given to "high-risk" personnel.⁴ The final portion of this chapter includes an evaluation of Code training based on the experiences of American POWs during the Vietnam War.

The Recommended Training Program

The Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War recognized that, in battle and in captivity, the ability of the fighting American to perform the duties required of him is a direct function of his training. As a portion of their report, the Committee recommended that the Services initiate a coordinated training program, to include:

1. General motivational and informational training in the high standards embodied in the Code. This type training was to be conducted throughout the career of all servicemen during active and reserve duty.
2. Specific training for combat-ready troops. The committee further stated that training must be uniform among the Services to the greatest degree practicable.⁵

⁴"High-risk": A classification given to military personnel more subject to enemy encounters. Some examples are combat aviators, underwater demolition teams, Rangers, Special Forces, etc.

⁵U.S., Department of the Air Force, Code of Conduct Preparation--Code of Conduct Application, ATC Study Guides S-V80-A-CCP, CCA-SG (Fairchild AFB, Wash.: Hq. 3636 Combat Crew Training Group, October 31, 1969), p. 4.

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The Services' Approach to TrainingU.S. Army⁶

To implement the instructions of Executive Order No. 10631, the U.S. Army published AR 350-30, Code of Conduct, as early as December 30, 1957. This regulation has been updated irregularly with the latest edition being dated November 5, 1971.⁷

To implement the above regulation, each new member of the U.S. Army was and is given approximately six to twelve hours of instruction combining the subjects of Code Conduct, Escape and Evasion, and Survival (SERE).

This early training consists of both classroom and practical exercises in the interrogation aspect. These exercises are taught using unsophisticated interrogation techniques. In addition, personnel classified as "high-risk" receive an additional block of SERE training--of approximately forty hours duration--as a portion of their special training course. The Army considers both the initial SERE training and the special SERE training to be in the school phase.

Upon completion of the school phase of training, each individual is required to receive additional annual unit refresher SERE training of unspecified duration. In 1971, the responsibility

⁶Personal interview with Charles Gomon, Lt. Col., USA, DAMO-ODU, February 8, 1974.

⁷U.S., Department of the Army, Education and Training--Code of Conduct, AR 350-30 (Washington, D.C.: November 5, 1971), pp. 1-11.

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for the unit training policy shifted from the Department of the Army to the field command.

In today's Army, each unit conducts refresher SERE training as often as is necessary, or, to put it another way, as much as the unit mission dictates. The accomplishment of adequate unit SERE training is checked during the command's training inspections.

During the discussion with Lieutenant Colonel Charles Gomon, USA, DAMO-ODU, the subject of what the Army taught with respect to the "big four"⁸ was questioned. The response given by Lieutenant Colonel Gomon was that during the period 1955 through 1968, the policy was "hard line." This is defined to mean that the "big four" litany is all a prisoner can tell his captors. Any statement or answer beyond the "big four" would be in violation of the Code, subjecting the prisoner to disciplinary action under the UCMJ.⁹

No cognizance appears to have been given to that portion of Article V of the Code which states, "I will evade answering

⁸The "big four" are name, rank, service number, and date of birth. Since its formulation, the most controversial part of the Code has been Article V, which states: "When questioned, should I become a prisoner of war, I am bound to give only name, rank, service number, and date of birth. I will evade answering further questions to the best of my ability. I will make no oral or written statements disloyal to my country and its allies or harmful to their cause."

⁹Uniform Code of Military Justice--the Armed Services basic legal document. See also AR 350-30 dated November 12, 1946, sec. IV, par. 11.

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further questions to the utmost of my ability," except that a member may expect court-martial action in the event of noncompliance. No training was provided to show one how to react in the event the individual no longer has that ability to ". . . evade answering further questions . . ." or to refrain from making "oral or written statements." Of course, this is not the only article of the Code for which specific training was not provided, but it is undoubtedly the one which has been challenged, or criticized, the most. However, the Army was not the only Service to misinterpret this article. The subject of misinterpretation of the Code is discussed at length in Chapters II, IV, V, and VI.

The "hard line" policy was still in force during the period 1968 through 1971. Yet, with the return of some U.S. servicemen from Vietnamese prison camps, a period of evaluation and research of their experiences took place. A quiet undertone of "try to avoid giving any information to your captors" was evident in Code and SERE training, but the official policy remained "hard line."

In 1971, as a result of its research, the U.S. Army Combat Development Command produced a secret report whose short title is U.S. POW(s).¹⁰ This four-volume secret report was shelved pending the release of American POWs by the

¹⁰U.S., Department of the Army, U.S. Army Combat Development Command, Doctrine for Captured/Detained U.S. Military Personnel (U.S. POW)(s), 4 vols. (Ft. Belvoir, Va.: 1972).

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Vietnamese, except for that portion concerning the "Homecoming" aspects.¹¹ The report remains the most definitive, yet unused, work covering the Army's viewpoint of POW-related matters.

U.S. Navy¹²

In 1955 the U.S. Navy introduced academic Code training into Induction Center Training for all personnel and into its Survival School being conducted for high-risk personnel. Included in this 5 to 5 1/2-day program was one day for academics wherein the trainees were given demonstrated techniques of interrogation. The Navy policy at that time regarding the "big four" was "hard-line"--with no deviation.¹³

In 1959, the Navy policy, and subsequently the course curriculum, was changed to provide the trainees individual interrogation experiences. However, in practicality, only those who were "caught" during the evasion phase of their training were subjected to this interrogation. The hard-line-only approach was still being taught. The revised policy also

¹¹Homecoming: The activities related to the releases of U.S. POWs from Vietnam, to include: release, initial medical examinations, intelligence debriefing, and return to U.S. control within the continental U.S. for further medical and intelligence debriefings.

¹²Personal interview with Paul Cook, Cdr., USN, Head NFO Training Section (NOP591D), Washington, D.C., January 25, 1974.

¹³This is later borne out by statements obtained from former Navy POWs. *Infra*, p. 38-40.

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stipulated that those high-risk personnel who had already taken the course prior to this policy change were to receive the revised training.

In the late 1960s a SERE seminar was introduced for Navy tactical air crews. This was a 2 1/2 to 3-day advanced seminar to incorporate some of the latest thinking on SERE techniques. Specifically, the emphasis was shifted from "only-big-four" to "all you were required to give." This new thinking was based on three primary sources: (1) Robert Klusman's (Commander, USN, an escapee from a Laotian POW prison camp) testimony before the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS); (2) The Secretary of Defense's announcement not to prosecute some actions by POWs; and (3) The U.S. Navy Judge Advocate's ruling that the Code was not a legally binding instrument.¹⁴

The present curriculum teaches the hard-line response as a technique of resistance. Specific Code training is presented in one forty-five minute class, yet the entire curriculum is interrelated to provide the individual a basis for adherence to the Code, as interpreted by the Navy.¹⁵

¹⁴Thoughts expressed by Cdr. Cook--not necessarily the official U. S. Navy viewpoint.

¹⁵Revised Curriculum Outline, 5-Day Course E-2D-0032 (San Diego, Calif.: Fleet Aviation Specialized Operational Tng. Group, Pacific Fleet, Naval Air Station, North Island, April 1973).

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U. S. Marine Corps¹⁶

Code training is an integral part of Marine initial training. Enlisted personnel receive a two-hour lecture during Basic School while the officer receives one hour in Basic School. All are required to receive an additional session on the Code six months later. In addition, each Marine is responsible for demonstrating knowledge in twelve essential subjects each year. One of these twelve is the Code. The performance objective is to be able to explain the points of the Code in his own words. If unable to do so, his unit provides additional training in the subject. The Marine Corps also requires its personnel to demonstrate the essential knowledge upon reenlistment and prior to deployment overseas.

There is a SERE school for the Marine high-risk contingent located at Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Cherry Point, North Carolina--similar in structure to the Navy SERE schools. This school is relatively new and, until its coming into being about a year ago, Marine high-risk personnel were receiving that training at Navy schools.

"One particularly important aspect of the Marine SERE course is its lack of a POW compound phase. This is by direction of the Commandant, U.S.M.C."¹⁷ The Marine SERE

¹⁶Personal Interview with Ralph E. Knapper, Maj., USMC (MC-A03C), February 22, 1974.

¹⁷Ibid.

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course does include instruction, demonstration, and practical exercise in survival, escape, and evasion.

When questioned about Article V of the Code and the responses that a Marine would be expected to give if he were to become a POW and interrogated by his captors, Major Knapper said, "There is no directive I know of that says the 'big-four' can be deviated from."

U.S. Air Force¹⁸

Air Force survival schools were conducting a form of resistance training even before the outbreak of the Korean War.¹⁹ The promulgation of the Code and issuance of training guidance along with the results of intensive studies of the Korean War returnee provide the basis for a more sophisticated SERE school.

High-risk personnel of the Air Force are required to attend the survival school at least once. In 1966, an area refresher survival school was established in the Philippines for air crews operating in SEA with the main emphasis being survival and evasion.

The resistance training at Air Force survival schools located at Stead AFB and later at Fairchild AFB is conducted

¹⁸Personal interviews with Roger Sorenson, Maj., USAF, AFXOX; and Claude Watkins, AFIS. U.S., DAF, Code of Conduct Preparation, p. 28, n. 5.

¹⁹Ibid., Study Guides, p. 7.

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in simulated prison compounds with each individual being subjected to the various techniques of interrogation and each individual having the opportunity to "play the game" using various techniques of resistance. It would be well to notice here that the hard-line response was but one of the techniques of resistance taught. This was the case in February 1964 when Colonel Raymond Merritt, one of the writers, attended the course at Stead AFB.

Apparent Differences in Service Philosophy
Regarding Code Training

It is apparent that some basic philosophical differences exist among the services concerning SERE activity. One of the most apparent differences is the relative importance placed upon simulated POW compound training²⁰--from being very important within the course of Air Force SERE training to being prohibited in the course of Marine SERE training.

Another major difference among the services is their approach to Article V of the Code--from "hard-line big-four," to "big four" as a technique of resisting. This latter difference was the cause of a great deal of anguish as is pointed out later in this paper.

In a memorandum sent after the release of American POWs from North Vietnam to the Vice Chief of Naval Operations,

²⁰POW compound training: Simulation of POW situations to include both the isolation and compound (group) phases.

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Vice Admiral D. H. Bagley states, ". . . There are enough differences between the way Navy and Air Force personnel responded to make a unilateral Navy review of these areas desirable."²¹

Code of Conduct Training as Viewed by Former
American POWs of the Vietnam War

In response to a survey conducted by the writers among former Vietnam War POWs in attendance at both the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) and the National War College (NWC), eight former POWs commented upon the subject of their training in the Code. Admittedly, this is a small sample; nevertheless, it does indicate what training each had received to prepare him for captivity.

Captain William Lawrence, USN:

. . . My training was completely hard-line, i.e., name, rank, serial number, or death. In fact, as I recall, there was nothing said about need for cover stories.

Commander Raymond Vohden, USN:

. . . I received a one-hour lecture on each article of the Code by a Navy Chaplain in 1959. At survival school in 1964, we had two or three lectures on the Code and one pep-talk about resisting. All my training was hard-line.

²¹D. H. Bagley, Memo for VCNO, Subj.: POW Matters (C), U.S., Department of the Navy, NOP, Washington, D.C., July 13, 1973.

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Commander James Bell, USN:

. . . One one-hour class of COC taught by a second-class petty officer. Policy was taught to give only name, rank, serial number, DOB (date of birth). Nothing was said about what to do after that. I recall one question, "What do we do when given an opportunity to write home? Aren't we then giving more info like wife's name and address, etc.?" The instructor could not answer the question.

Students were subjected to actual interrogation only if caught during E & E phase. I was not caught.

Captain James Mehl, USN:

I read the Code, signed it and had it inserted in my service record. I was instructed on its contents at survival schools, and in squadron briefings. We were given the hard-line. (Ugh.)

At one school, Warner Springs, I received some very bad info in event of breaking. I was told not to lie if I gave info, but to tell facts as they were so I could remember the next time asked so as not to be caught lying.

Colonel James Bean, USAF:

I received enough training to understand the Code. Hard-line only My training was adequate, although I did not attend Stead

Colonel William Burroughs, USAF:

I received Code training in May '65 at Stead AFB. It included recommendations for a cover story. I thought my training covered the essentials

Colonel D. Dutton, USAF:

I did not go through any survival school except the one at Clark AB, where no resistance training or COC was given. The only "formal" COC training I received was . . . 1960-63 as part of ground training. What little that was given was hard-line only. Mostly it was just to teach what the COC actually said --no interpretation. As you can see, my training was very inadequate.

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Colonel Samuel Johnson, USAF:

Training. Stead Survival School in 1958; they emphasized that there were two ways to resist, i. e., name, rank bit, or cranking up a story to tell. They said the latter was harder to hold to based on Korean experience . . . I consider the training I had as excellent.

Results of Survey of POWs
Regarding Code Training

A summary of the above comments indicates the different approaches used by the Navy and Air Force survival schools to training given in respect to Article V of the Code.

A study of the results of the "Survey" concerning training in the Code and related SERE training reveals that, of 308 respondents, 305 or 99 percent attended a formal survival school with 237 or 80 percent attending that same or another survival school for a second time.²²

Responses to the question, "At the time of your capture, how familiar were you with the provisions of the Code of Conduct?" were distributed as indicated in Table 3-1.

From the table, it can be concluded that the vast majority of POWs had a familiarity with and of the Code. Unit training is also supposed to make the individual knowledgeable in the SERE related subjects upon which the Code is based. In a series of questions, the respondent was asked to rate his combat unit training program for survival, resistance, escape, and

²²"Survey": Questions A-2, A-4.

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TABLE 3-1

FAMILIARITY WITH THE CODE

Totally Unfamiliar	Very Unfamiliar	Not Familiar	Somewhat Familiar	Familiar	Very Familiar
0	.66	2.30	26.56	48.52	21.97

NOTE: Numbers represent percent of respondents.

SOURCE: "Survey": Question E-45.

evasion training, in relation to the realities of captivity. (Refer to Table 3-2 for responses to these questions.)

Although we train to be able to accomplish the ultimate (total resistance), the rating given that training program is borne out here--at least in the minds of the 308 respondents. The unit training programs tended to be inadequate, not pertinent, cursory and infrequent. Still, they were a mandatory part of the training program and did tend to create a minor advantage in personal self-confidence.

Another series of questions brings light upon how the respondent characterizes his unit training program prior to the time of his capture. (Refer to Table 3-3 for responses to these questions.)

The results shown in Table 3-3 indicate that there was a weakness in unit SERE training activities. It should be noted here that the respondents cited are predominately Air

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TABLE 3-2
RATING OF UNIT TRAINING PROGRAMS FOR SURVIVAL,
RESISTANCE, ESCAPE, AND EVASION

(Good)	A	B	C	D	E	(Bad)
Adequate	4.97	19.87	18.21	24.50	32.45	Inadequate
Pertinent	6.93	25.74	22.77	26.73	17.82	Not Pertinent
Created Confidence	6.62	24.50	49.01	13.25	6.62	Created Apprehension
Detailed	2.98	13.58	24.50	29.47	29.47	Cursory
Mandatory	38.41	20.86	19.54	8.94	12.25	Optional
Frequent	4.64	16.23	26.82	19.21	33.11	Infrequent

NOTE: Numbers represent percent of respondents.

SOURCE: "Survey": Questions A-24-29.

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TABLE 3-3

CHARACTERIZATION OF UNIT SURVIVAL, EVASION AND ESCAPE, AND
RESISTANCE TRAINING PROGRAM BEFORE TAKEN INTO CAPTIVITY

Question	Never	Seldom	Sometimes	Usually	Always
Training was carefully presented and informative	15.51	36.96	28.05	16.83	2.62
Unit training was consistent with my basic SERE training	10.03	18.73	21.07	40.80	9.36
Training was frivolous and there was "horsing around"	17.79	40.94	29.19	9.73	2.35
Training was highly regarded	13.42	28.52	33.56	21.81	2.68
I believe my training was consistent with other Services	4.68	14.05	33.44	43.14	4.68

NOTE: Numbers represent percent of respondents.

SOURCE: "Survey": Questions A-30-34.

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Force air crew members (203) with lesser numbers of Navy air crew members (89), and a few Marine air crew members (13). There was no representation from the Marine or Army foot soldier ranks.

From the above analysis, one can conclude that the POW received a variety of training in the various aspects of the Code. Except for persons categorized as "high-risk," the training was minimal. Even "high-risk" persons were trained in a nonconsistent pattern, especially with respect to Article V, and follow-on or unit training was, in general, mediocre.

In the following chapter, the application of that training is examined in an attempt to determine if the Code is a viable document--from a perspective of an individual actually facing the challenges of a prisoner-of-war camp.

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CHAPTER IV

UTILIZATION OF THE CODE IN VIETNAM

Introduction

American POWs that were detained in camps throughout Vietnam and portions of Cambodia constitute vast pools of information related to the application of those ideas advocated in the Code. The returned POWs from these countries are the largest group of American POWs who were expected to uphold the principles of the Code.

All returning POWs were questioned about their entire prison experiences upon their return to United States control. These initial debriefings produced only sketchy comments about the effects that the Code had upon the POWs. As might be expected, those sketchy results span the spectrum from those positive toward the Code to those negative toward it.

To gain more definitive answers to the questions relating to utilization of the Code, the writers of this paper utilized both the "Survey" and the transcript of a briefing presented to the U.S. Army Chief of Staff.¹

¹U.S., Department of the Army, "Lessons Learned Briefing to the Chief of Staff, Army" (Washington, D.C.: August 30, 1973); hereinafter referred to as the "Army Briefing."

This chapter is the heart of this report. The concerns, the shortcomings, as well as the successes the POW had when applying the provisions of the Code are brought into perspective.

Statement of the Subsidiary Question

The following subsidiary question is examined in this chapter:

How was the Code utilized in Vietnam--was it of value, or was it detrimental to the POW?

The respondents to the "Survey" are Navy, Marine, and Air Force personnel. The "Army Briefing" summarizes the experiences of both Army and civilian personnel detained in both Vietnam and Cambodia. The panel that composed the briefing group consisted of eight Army officers and five enlisted men, all of whom were POWs during the Vietnam War.

Overall Evaluation of the Code

The respondents to the "Survey" were predominantly in agreement when answering questions concerning usefulness of the Code as a resistance tool as indicated in Table 4-1.

The Code calls for consideration by the POW in eight basic areas: Resistance, escape, parole, accepting special favor, collaboration, organization, divulging information, and responsibility for actions. Table 4-2 shows the reactions of the respondents as to how useful or how useless were these instructions,

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TABLE 4-1
USEFULNESS OF THE CODE AS A RESISTANCE TOOL

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
During very early (initial) stages of captivity	2.63	5.59	11.51	42.11	38.16
During entire period of captivity	2.96	11.51	16.78	39.80	28.95

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NOTE: Numbers represent percent of respondents.

SOURCE: "Survey": Questions E-26, E-27.

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TABLE 4-2
EVALUATION OF BASIC ACTIVITIES COVERED BY THE CODE

Question	Very Useless	Useless	Neither	Useful	Highly Useful
Code instructions for resistance	3.30	12.87	10.23	53.47	20.13
Code instructions for escape	9.87	19.74	30.59	33.88	5.92
Code instructions for parole	2.97	11.55	12.54	45.21	27.72
Code instructions accepting special favours	1.97	5.92	9.21	53.95	28.95
Code requirements for organization	1.32	5.28	7.26	48.18	37.95
Code instructions for divulging information	4.28	15.79	17.43	44.41	18.09
Code policy toward collaboration	0.66	8.22	9.21	48.68	33.22
Code position on POW responsibility for personal actions	2.96	12.17	14.80	38.49	31.58

NOTE: Numbers represent percent of respondents.

SOURCE: "Survey": Questions E-37-44.

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requirements, or policies of the Code concerning these eight factors. The following comment is from the "Army Briefing":

We consider Articles I, IV, and VI to be clear, well written and adequately explained Article V is another matter. It is unrealistic to assume that a man can go "X" number of years repeating the "Big Four"²

Useful or useless, the Code had to be translated into actions by the POWs or the organization of the POWs.

Evaluation of the Application of the
Surrender Clause of the Code

The efforts to resist surrender to a captor will not be discussed in this text, except to say that nearly every case is different. Some men were able to evade successfully; others were captured within minutes. There is no known case of any American POW who surrendered of his own free will or induced others to do so. There are, of course, tales of many American airmen, especially in North Vietnam, who were heard or seen on the ground but are still in the missing category, or have been declared dead. It is impossible to say to what extent these men resisted capture or if they were even capable of doing so. The Army POWs had no specific comment on this subject. The first moments in the hands of a captor are, without a doubt, a frightening experience. Your captor's actions and your reactions are

²"Army Briefing": p. 9.

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~~unknowns~~. Injury may or may not be present, but the fear of the ~~unknown~~ is present.

Evaluation of the Application of the Clause
in Article V against Divulging
Information to the Enemy

Attempts to gain information from a POW prior to his being placed into the regular prison routine were routine. The captors used a great variety of means to accomplish this. Many were psychological or nonphysical coercion or intimidation such as direct questioning, threats, fear, deception, etc. (Ninety-nine percent of the respondents report being questioned directly.) If the former methods were unsuccessful, more physical approaches were taken--from application of "significant pain" to withholding of food and water. (Application of "significant pain" in physical mistreatment was used said 72.64 percent of the respondents and 58.63 percent reported that food and water were withheld.)³

An examination of what the respondents consider the effectiveness of attempts to gain information during this initial phase indicates, in general, that nonphysical methods to gain information were ineffective while those physical methods were effective.⁴

³"Survey": Questions B-13-35.

⁴Ibid., Questions B-36-58.

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As a result of the initial period of interrogation/
exploitation before the start of a regular prison routing, some
POWs gave information they believed to be militarily significant
(13.49 percent) or wrote propaganda statements or made tapes/
broadcasts (26.07 percent). All of these types of events were as
a result of the application of "significant pain."⁵

Only 1.97 percent of the respondents gave what they
considered to be important military information under the threat
of severe punishment, while 10.53 percent wrote propaganda
statements or made tapes/broadcasts under the threat of severe
punishment.⁶ Twenty-one percent report that they wrote propa-
ganda statements or made tapes/broadcasts under threat of
severe punishment after having been previously punished.⁷ The
"Survey" also indicates that 65.25 percent successfully coun-
tered exploitation efforts, 25.25 percent were not sure if they
did, and only 9.51 percent were unable to counter exploitation
efforts, by furnishing unimportant information.⁸

Many different approaches were utilized to some
degree of effectiveness to protect giving vital information up to
the point of application of "significant pain"; but, in all cases,

⁵Ibid., Questions B-100, B-101.

⁶Ibid., Questions B-105, B-103.

⁷Ibid., Question B-104.

⁸Ibid., Question B-106.

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these involved the giving of some type of information. It is significant to recognize that 63.49 percent and 15.79 percent of the respondents felt it was "very ineffective" and "fairly ineffective" respectively to stick to the "big four" response of name, rank, service number, and date of birth.⁹ When attempting to protect vital information, 34.88 percent and 22.92 percent of the respondents felt it "very ineffective" and "fairly ineffective" respectively to "make it appear that belligerence or lack of cooperation would make further efforts to exploit too difficult and not worth the effort."¹⁰ During this initial phase, 74.75 percent of the respondents found writing apologies to escape further punishment was of no value.¹¹ It should be noted, however, that not all respondents were given the opportunity to write apologies during this initial phase. The Vietnamese wanted some military information and would not usually accept less.

Regular Phase of Captivity

Once out of the initial period of interrogation/exploitation, the POW started his "regular" prison routine. Since the fall of 1969 appears to be a turning point in the treatment pattern displayed by the North Vietnamese, the same series of questions

⁹Ibid., Question B-114.

¹⁰Ibid., Question B-120.

¹¹Ibid., Question B-102.

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relating to interrogation/exploitation was asked of those captured before the fall of 1969 and those captured after the fall of 1969.

In the responses of 239 POWs captured before Fall 1969, it is evident that the intensity of nonphysical approaches to interrogation/exploitation diminished during the regular phase. For example, only 66.67 percent were subjected more than occasionally to direct questioning,¹² as compared to 99 percent during the initial phase.

The use of physical mistreatment with "significant pain" dropped in the "more-than-occasional" frequency to 22.36 percent and that of "mistreatment without significant pain" rose to 51.05 percent.¹³ The withholding-of-food-and-water occurred at about the same rate (65.82 percent) as it did during the initial phase.¹⁴

The effectiveness of attempts to gain information by nonphysical methods decreased somewhat while those attempts that involved physical mistreatment with "significant pain" increased. On the other hand, the attempts that involved physical mistreatment without "significant pain" decreased noticeably.¹⁵

¹²Ibid., Question C-4.

¹³Ibid., Questions C-10, C-11.

¹⁴Ibid., Question C-13.

¹⁵Ibid., Questions C-33, C-44.

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As a result of the interrogation/exploitation attempts during this period of regular camp life, a lesser percentage of POWs gave information either "under significant pain" or "threat of severe punishment." During this phase, 51.48 percent of the POWs successfully countered exploitation efforts by furnishing unimportant information, and 62.87 percent of the POWs were able to write apologies for misbehavior to escape further punishment.¹⁶

The "regular" prison routine phase after the fall of 1969 was even significantly less intense in both the application of "nonphysical" approaches and of the "physical mistreatment" approaches to gain the submission of the POW. For example, threats were used more than "occasionally" on only 33.0 percent of the POWs, and the application of "significant pain" was reported as "never" being used by 70.07 percent and only "rarely" being used by another 22 percent of the POWs. The withholding of food or water as a means of gaining submission of the POW dropped to where 91.12 percent report it was "never" or "rarely" used.¹⁷

Likewise, during this period, there was a decrease in the effectiveness of "nonphysical" approaches to obtain compliance from the POW. The effectiveness of applying "significant

¹⁶Ibid., Questions C-65-71.

¹⁷Ibid., Questions D-2-24.

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to obtain compliance remained high, but, as noted above, this method seldom was used during this period.

During this third phase of prison life, the use of threats or physical mistreatment to gain important military information, propaganda statements or tape/broadcasts were more successfully countered by POWs by writing apologies or furnishing unimportant information.¹⁸

Evaluation of Some of the Types of
Information Sought by the Enemy

An indication of perhaps why it was easier to get away with unimportant writings in the later phases is apparent from the type of information sought by the captor. In the initial interrogation/exploitation phase, the information sought was usually of a military nature (i. e., aircraft, unit, personnel, target, tactics, etc.); while, in the later two phases, the emphasis switched to that of gaining statements/tapes for propaganda use, the collection of information on POW camp organization, or communication, and the attempt to change the POW's attitude toward the war.

How does all of the foregoing discussion apply to the Code? The basic philosophy taught by the various services regarding "big four" only versus "big four" as a technique caused some POWs to suffer undue hardship. Over 73 percent of the

¹⁸Ibid., Questions D-67, D-70.

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respondents feel it is "very difficult," 18.39 percent feel it "difficult," and another 21.55 percent feel it "fairly difficult" to avoid complying with the captors' demands when subjected to physical mistreatment involving "significant pain."¹⁹ Therefore, the POW submits to the demands and gives some type of information or statement, and in doing so, those attempting to uphold the "big four only" feel they have committed an offense not only against the United States but also themselves.

Once the POW feels he has broken the Code, he is left with a tremendous guilt feeling that can be exploited easily by his captors. In his own mind, he must justify the breaking of the Code. Therefore, many POWs relied upon a higher sense of morality to justify their guilt feelings. Another source of strength to help justify guilt was that strength and knowledge gained from POW organizations. The knowledge that others shared the POW challenge, while not an excuse, contributes to individual strength and common cause. In the South, there were additional factors.

Because of the social conflict in the U.S. among racial and ethnic groups, members of the minority groups became subject to special propaganda techniques. The Communists made it plain from the outset that they were going to use racial differences as a means of dividing prisoners. Every opportunity was used to remind blacks of the oppression, inequality and downtrodden position of the blacks in American history, with emphasis placed on the recent conflict. Angela Davis and the Black Panthers were presented

¹⁹Ibid., Question D-86.

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as the saviors and martyrs of the black people. Martin Luther King's assassination was presented as the work of the CIA under President Johnson's direction. There was a constant effort to stress all out of proportion the difficulties and inequalities in our society. The effectiveness of the attempts to exploit domestic minority problems was dependent on several factors:

(1) The age of the black soldier who was being interrogated. Older blacks who had reached NCO grades and who were more professional in their outlook on the military could more easily resist their techniques.

(2) The premilitary concepts of society that the prisoner had. To the poorly educated or under privileged, a certain truth could be seen in this propaganda which would make him more easily influenced.

(3) The skills of the interrogator. Some attempts were very crude and only a fool could fall for the line being given. However, more sophisticated approaches proved more successful.²⁰

Evaluation of the Application of Command and Control Aspects of the Code

From the earliest days, POWs in North Vietnam exercised the aspects of the Code concerning command. Though POWs were prohibited by the Vietnamese from communicating with one another, lines of communication were maintained. The POWs risked almost certain "punishment" if caught communicating with one another in their separate cells.

In the South, POWs were more susceptible to psychological aberrations

. . . as a result of hopelessness, very long internment and inadequate cerebral nutrition. Command structure deteriorates as many POWs become consumed by self-interest, suspicion, open hostility,

²⁰"Army Briefing": pp. 8-9.

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lack of patience, sympathy or compassion for fellow prisoners. Early prisoner release aggravated this problem. There were isolated incidents of the strong simply taking food from the weak, but normally it was the reverse.²¹

The communication network became a vital link in the establishment of the command system. This is discussed in more detail later in this chapter.

Except in a relatively few cases where a POW was isolated, the "word" was circulated as to who was the senior ranking officer (SRO) in the camp. Then, the next junior and on down the line were identified. Each room that had more than one occupant had an SRO and each building had a known SRO. As communication channels were improved, the camp SRO began to establish a loose form of organization.

It is essential that a strong and viable organizational structure and chain of command be instituted. It is difficult to command respect from someone, when you live side by side, twenty-four hours a day under stress, because the slightest blemish in a man's character becomes a glaring shortcoming. Good leadership and training can help solve this problem.

Early attempts by the camp SRO to provide policy covering specific aspects of camp life were essentially fruitless. The primary challenge was the difficulty of communication between cells, buildings, and separate camps. Yet, prior to the

²¹Ibid., p. 7.

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regrouping of prisoners in the fall of 1970, 83.33 percent of the respondents were aware of a command structure established in the camps.²²

The culmination of the POW organization in North Vietnam came in late 1970 when, for the first time, the overwhelming majority of POWs were brought together into one camp. The SRO established the 4th Allied POW Wing. Each of the separate large cell blocks was designated a squadron. Staffs at wing and squadron levels were organized.

Guidance to interpret or further expand the Code for specific problem areas was formalized as policy statements--nicknamed "Plums."

The Code requirements for organization were useful and were followed by those POWs in North Vietnam. Eighty-six percent of the respondents felt the 4th POW Wing was effective, 89 percent felt the Wing was well-organized, and 88.5 percent of the respondents were fully aware of leadership and a command structure after the formation of the Wing. (The lack of complete knowledge may be accounted for by latter arrivals who were sent to outlying camps.)²³

²²"Survey": Question E-56.

²³Ibid., Questions E-41, E-54, E-58, E-59.

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The POWs in the North were aware of the requirement to seek out the SRO and 91.94 percent felt that they did so.²⁴ In response to the statement, "If Senior, sought to take charge," 87.9 percent responded that they agreed with the statement.²⁵ There were cases where the stress connected with assumption of command in the North Vietnamese prison camps caused some instances of POWs shying away from command responsibility.

One senior officer declared he would not assume command at one particular point in time because he feared that he would be included in a "comm" purge and he might be forced to reveal highly classified or sensitive information to the enemy.²⁶

As in any organization, discipline can be a problem for the SRO when living in confined cells with each other for twenty-four hours a day. Opinions on policies and solutions to problems can vary. The most frequent causes for infractions of POW discipline can be identified in Table 4-3.

The personal recollection of the writers is that infractions of discipline were rare. The most serious infraction

²⁴Ibid., Question E-52.

²⁵Ibid., Question E-53.

²⁶"Comm" purge: When the Vietnamese started to crack down on the covert communication taking place, they would select suspected seniors or prisoners they knew to be communicating and apply "significant pain" to extract information on communications and POW organization. A POW in that position might also be forced to "confess" or admit to other sensitive information.

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TABLE 4-3

MOST FREQUENT CAUSES OF INFRACTIONS OF POW DISCIPLINE

Question	Never	Rarely	Occasionally	Often	Always
No real authority was (or could be) directly applied	3.95	33.22	32.57	28.62	1.64
Individual POW ego or stubbornness	1.64	20.07	48.68	27.63	1.97
Fear of captors	4.28	19.41	40.46	34.21	1.64
Disagreement with policies of POW organization	1.32	36.96	44.88	16.83	--
Frustration with indi- vidual POW leaders	3.96	30.69	45.54	19.80	--

NOTE: Numbers represent percent of respondents.

SOURCE: "Survey": Questions E-2-6.

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being that alleged to a group of POWs who were kept in a camp separate from the main body of POWs. This group was apparently singled out by the Vietnamese as having leanings toward their cause and were used by them for propaganda purposes--at least it was viewed as such by the other POWs. Efforts were made to contact this group and advise them on the policies concerning collaboration and resistance established by the SRO--apparently to no success. The problems connected with communications (discussed later in this chapter) and isolation and perhaps the personal conviction of this isolated group of POWs in question are all certainly a contributing factor to the alleged infractions of discipline that developed.

Other sources of conflict among POWs were rated as illustrated in Table 4-4.

A follow-on question, "Efforts to clarify the Code [with 'Plums'] to make it uniform were effective," was answered affirmatively by 64.19 percent of the respondents.²⁷

Evaluation of the Application of the Escape Clause of the Code

Another of the sources of conflict among POWs in the North was that concerning escape. The Code is explicit in its instructions, yet it did cause contention. Why?

²⁷"Survey": Question E-47.

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TABLE 4-4
RATING OF OTHER SOURCES OF CONFLICT AMONG POWS

Question	Rarely	Sometimes	Often	Usually	Constantly
Disagreement over what we should resist and how	4.92	29.18	30.49	20.66	14.25
Unequal treatment of POWs by captors	42.95	36.72	12.79	4.26	3.28
Efforts to regulate eating, sleeping, exercising, etc.	33.77	42.62	17.05	5.25	1.31
Efforts to restrict contact with captors	30.72	50.65	15.03	2.61	0.98
Efforts to restrict reading of propaganda or watching propaganda movies	42.62	42.30	12.13	1.64	1.31

NOTE: Numbers represent percent of respondents.

SOURCE: "Survey": Questions E-121-25.

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As can be recognized, a great deal of effort must be put into any consideration and preparation for an escape. Even more consideration and preparation must be accomplished when the escape involves an environment where the escapee cannot blend into the local population.

There were successful escapes from the prisons in North Vietnam, but no successful escape from the country! Data in Tables 4-5 and 4-6 illustrate a number of factors that verify the feelings of the POWs in the North concerning escape.

When speaking of escape from North Vietnam, Master Sergeant (MSG) Brande, USA, one of the members of the Army briefing group, said, "Escape was almost impossible without a sophisticated covert E & E 'net.'" And then, shifting to the same problem in South Vietnam, he went on to say, "Although escape was still possible, increased security measures, and the lower level of health and fitness that was purposely imposed on prisoners, made escape highly improbable."²⁸

It is not the intention of this paper to detract from those escape efforts made, or of any escape efforts being planned, but only to point out that there was contention brought about when the POWs considered this requirement of the Code.

²⁸"Army Briefing": p. 5.

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TABLE 4-5
POW OPINION CONCERNING ESCAPE

Question	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
Escape to freedom was possible without outside assistance	59.21	21.38	6.58	10.20	2.63
Escape to freedom was possible <u>only</u> with outside aid	1.32	8.88	9.21	32.24	48.36
SROs were in favor of attempting escape	13.58	50.66	27.81	7.28	0.66
POWs generally were not in favor of attempting escape	1.32	7.89	15.13	58.55	17.11
The Code should be interpreted to mean escape should be attempted only when chances of escape are adequate and other POWs are not jeopardized	2.98	12.91	10.26	39.07	34.77
Escape techniques should be emphasized over evasion techniques in E&E training	10.82	47.21	30.82	8.85	2.30
Enough emphasis was given to escape training in survival school	9.21	36.51	18.09	33.88	2.30

NOTE: Numbers represent percent of respondents.

SOURCE: "Survey": Questions E-103-109.

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TABLE 4-6
FACTORS CONSIDERED BY POWS DURING ESCAPE PLANNING

Question	Very Unimportant	Somewhat Unimportant	Neither Unimportant nor Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important
Reprisals against escape	1.66	6.95	9.27	37.75	44.37
Low odd for success	0.99	0.99	1.32	25.74	70.96
Reprisals against fellow POWs who didn't attempt escape	2.97	7.26	5.94	40.59	43.23
General negative attitudes of POWs toward escape due to risks involved	1.66	9.60	18.87	47.35	22.52
Attitudes of SROs toward escape	1.99	3.97	20.20	39.07	34.77

NOTE: Numbers represent percent of respondents.

SOURCE: "Survey": Questions E-110-14.

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Evaluation of the Importance of Communication
to the Implementation of the Code

The American POW faced a unique situation in POW camps regarding communication. The Vietnamese attempted to stop all communication between adjoining cells, buildings and the various camps. Vietnamese camp rules expressly forbade communication. For a POW to be caught communicating usually meant punishment. Yet the establishment of a communications network is essential to any organization, particularly to the mental well-being of individuals or groups isolated within a hostile environment. Therefore, the POW risked punishment and did establish an elaborate communication network.

It is not the purpose of this paper to examine the methods of communications utilized in POW camps. Rather, it is the purpose to ascertain if that communication contributed to the implementation of the Code.

The majority (90.75 percent) of the respondents feel effective organization can be maintained in a noncommunal (isolation or semi-isolation) camp with tap, signal, and note communication only.²⁹ Analysis of the effectiveness of the camp organization bears this out.³⁰ In a noncommunal camp with no communication between units, discipline would be no problem for there would be no organization beyond the unit and each unit

²⁹"Survey": Question E-94.

³⁰Supra, pp. 58-9, footnote 21.

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would establish its own interpretation of the Code by mutual agreement or SRO decision. Once a camp-wide organization is established, the problems brought about by nonverbal/nonface-to-face communications grow. That messages were often misunderstood when transmitted by tap code was felt by 35.43 percent of the respondents; and 77.63 percent of the respondents agreed in varying degrees that effective discipline can be maintained with nonverbal communication only.³¹ As suggested earlier, the lack of ability to discipline or communicate may have been a contributing factor to the alleged misconduct of a small number of POWs. The majority of POWs (96.07 percent) felt that, due to the cryptic nature of communications, some messages were or could be garbled or misconstrued.³²

When a POW was accused of or caught in the act of communication--a violation of the "camp rules"--the result would usually be physical punishment. Resistance to admitting to or revealing communication/organization details were frequent causes for "significant pain" being administered by the Vietnamese camp officials. During the regular prison phase, 81.43 percent (pre-Fall 1969) and 52.3 percent (post-Fall 1969) of the respondents report that one of the priority concerns of the

³¹"Survey": Questions E-96, E-100.

³²Ibid., Question E-95.

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captors was to collect information on POW camp organization or communications.³³

The fear of being caught up in a "comm" purge was, as mentioned earlier, a cause for at least one officer's refusal, for a time, to assume command. On occasion, after being subjected to intense physical pain, a POW would drop out of the communication network for a period, returning when he had bolstered up his strength and courage again.

Some individuals had difficulty entering into the communication network because they were unaware of the nonvocal necessity for communication and no opportunity had yet developed to get the POW tap-code to them by covert means.³⁴

In spite of the extensive effort to stop communication, the Vietnamese were never completely successful in their efforts, except between-camp communication among certain isolated camps.

The imagination and ingenuity of the POWs in developing the communication network aided considerably in their being able to utilize the Code in North Vietnam.

³³Ibid., Questions C-59, D-59.

³⁴POW tap-code: A code developed by POWs in North Vietnam to permit nonvocal communication.

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The Army experienced the same trials and tribulations in their camps as discussed above, except communications broke down more frequently in some camps.³⁵

Evaluation of the Application of the Parole
and Special Favors Clause of the Code

The question of acceptance of parole or special favors was generally understood and followed. The question did arise though as to what was considered parole. Is "early release" considered parole?

The SRO considered it so when he issued a "Plum" stating "no early release." It would appear that the twelve men who did accept "early release" from North Vietnam did not consider that they were accepting parole. The possibility does exist that they were unaware of the various SROs' policies concerning early release, for those men were usually men who had been interned for only a relatively short time, and who were usually kept in an isolated camp or to themselves.³⁶ The possibility also exists that these men were forced to go home early by severe physical or mental pressures. This paper does not attempt to accuse or whitewash the men who accepted "early

³⁵"Army Briefing": p. J-1.

³⁶James Stockdale, Captain, USN, one of the SROs, established a policy, "We will all go home together," in early 1968. This policy was being used by others before that time. With the formation of the 4th POW Wing, this policy became a "Plum."

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release," but only to point out that many others who did not go home early were offered the opportunity for early release. They accepted what they considered a lawful order from the SRO that stated, "No early release."³⁷ This question is further discussed in Chapter V of this report.

The opportunity to accept what the respondents considered special favors often arose. Over 61 percent of the respondents reported such offerings, but all reported the offer was "very ineffective" or "somewhat ineffective" in accomplishing the purpose for which it was offered.³⁸ One of the "special favors" offered by the captors was that of extra food to sick or undernourished POWs. Even those offers were not consistent. Wing policy was that this extra food could be accepted. More often than not, the recipient would share what he had received as extra with his cell-mates, or at least offer to share it. In retrospect, it is felt that POWs lived up to that portion of the Code concerning acceptance of special favors, except if one considers the acceptance of early release a special favor.

Evaluation of the Application of the
Resistance Clause of the Code

There was nearly universal acceptance of the responsibility and necessity for resistance. The Code of Conduct

³⁷"Survey": Questions B-32, C-21, D-21.

³⁸Ibid., Questions B-33, B-56.

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Preparation Study Guide establishes some guidelines for resistance. These are:

Keep occupied, keep discipline, keep physically fit, eat everything you are offered and anything else you can procure, cooperate with your fellow prisoners, keep a sense of humor, keep trying to escape and aid others to escape, make every effort to communicate, and try to organize as much as possible.³⁹

In addition, there is the need to resist exploitation, and degradation.

In the North, a summation of acceptable resistance is stated in the motto of the 4th Allied POW Wing--"Home with Honor."

Many outside influences were felt to be, in varying degrees, detrimental to maintaining high morale while in prison camps.

Great numbers of interrogations that turned into indoctrinations, especially those held by VC A combination of isolation, severe mistreatment, to include significant pain, poor medical care (if any), an environment designed to promote complete submission, filthy living conditions, and poor food.⁴⁰

Add to the above the propaganda tools provided, perhaps unknowingly, to the Vietnamese by prominent Americans--politicians, senior retired military officers, entertainers and others critical of the war and our role in Southeast Asia--were

³⁹U.S., DAF, Code of Conduct Preparation, Study Guides, p. 28, n. 5.

⁴⁰"Army Briefing": p. 8.

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frequently quoted or misquoted in an attempt by the Vietnamese to influence the POW.

Efforts by the POW to keep occupied, physically fit, to cooperate with one another were numerous. In the North, nearly all of the detainees participated in the POW-initiated and -taught educational programs, after these programs were finally allowed by the Vietnamese in late 1970. Nearly all of the POWs were engaged in some sort of exercise program within the confines of their cells. To show "displeasure" at gross injustices on the part of the captors, a "Plum" was formulated to establish a camp-wide series of escalating resistance postures. The few times these were used, the captors took notice of the POWs' displeasure, but their actions were not always what the POWs desired.

Religious observations contributed to the mental well-being of many of the POWs. Before 1970 these observances were held covertly, if at all. But, after the fall of 1970, quiet religious observances conducted by the POWs were permitted by the North Vietnamese.

The acceptance and spirit with which the respondents adhered to Article VI of the Code⁴¹ can best be illustrated by the comment Admiral Denton made at Clark Air Base in the Philippine Islands on February 12, 1973 following his release from a

⁴¹See Appendix 1 for text of this article.

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North Vietnamese prison camp, when he said, ". . . God Bless America."⁴²

Consideration of the Civilian-Military
Mix in POW Camps

The international conventions relative to the treatment of POWs specify that both civilian and military personnel may be maintained in common camps with women being quartered in separate dormitories.⁴³

The Code does not provide for, or even suggest consideration of the consequences of a civilian-military intermix in a POW camp. A portion of the Army briefing was devoted to this subject. Evidently some problems did develop ensuing from this type of intermix, but details were not discussed: "Some civilian prisoners would not accept the military chain of command nor would they agree to adhere to the Code of Conduct per se."⁴⁴

The writers are unaware of any specific problems related to this subject in the camps in which they were detained, nor did any of the respondents to the survey note any problems. Yet, this situation can occur again in some future conflict.

⁴²Pacific Stars and Stripes (Washington, D. C.: February 12, 1973), p. 1.

⁴³U. S., Congress, "Diplomatic Conference for the Establishment of International Conventions for the Protection of Victims of War, Geneva 1949" (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1970), Article 25, p. 11.

⁴⁴"Army Briefing": p. 10.

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CHAPTER V

DEFICIENCIES IN THE CODE AND
IN CODE-RELATED ACTIVITIES

Introduction

The majority (80.27 percent) of the respondents to the "Survey" felt the Code was a useful resistance tool during the entire period of captivity. Again, the majority (68.75 percent) felt it was especially useful during the initial stages of captivity.¹ Yet, many of the returned POWs responding to the "Survey" or expressing themselves in official high-level Service debriefings felt there were changes that were necessary both in the Code and in activities related to the Code.

The members of the group in the official Army debriefing before the Chief of Staff, Army, found fault only with Article V of the Code. This view is discussed later in this chapter.

Statement of the Subsidiary Question

The following subsidiary question is addressed in this chapter:

¹Supra, Table 4-1, p. 47.

Are there deficiencies in the Code and in Code-related activities?

The ranges of responses to the "Survey" are narrowed to examine what the writers of this paper consider to be the major deficiencies in the Code and such Code-related activities as interpretation, training, and application.

Deficiencies in the Code

Views of respondents to the "Survey" questions regarding changes to the Code were spread, but a fairly good pattern of perhaps three major problem areas in the Code becomes apparent from examination of Table 5-1.

These three problem areas are that of: (1) the wording of Article V, (2) giving of information, and (3) portions of Article III--dealing with the escape clause and the parole clause.

Article III

A discussion of the application of the escape clause of Article III is contained in the prior chapter in this report.² The responses to Question E-21 (see Table 5-1) lean more toward the tendency to leave that portion of the Code as it is now written. Yet, because of the arguments and summation, one can gather from an examination of Table 4-5--POW Opinion Concerning Escape--and, in particular, Question E-107, that there

²Supra, p. 64.

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TABLE 5-1
CHANGES TO THE CODE

Question	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
Changed to permit giving more than "big-four"	9.30	19.60	12.62	39.20	19.27
Changed to remove obligation to escape	14.52	30.03	25.08	21.45	8.91
Changed to specify who should be the SRO or NCOIC	13.53	45.87	19.80	16.17	4.62
Clarified with regard to question of parole, special favors, early release, amnesty	3.28	14.43	10.16	41.64	30.49
Other changes not covered in categories above	5.02	20.07	30.43	30.43	14.05

NOTE: Numbers represent percent of respondents.

SOURCE: "Survey": Questions E-20, E-21, E-25, E-28.

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b 7

appears to be cause for examination of the descriptive paragraph dealing with escape in the instructional material on Article III.

Also contained in Article III of the Code is the requirement to accept neither parole nor special favors. This has been discussed in the previous chapter.³ Responses to the question concerning the subject are contained in Table 4-5, and indicate that clarification should be made on Article III. More specifically, military personnel need to understand that "early-release" is considered the same as accepting parole. Understanding of what actually transpired in the way of inducements--either physical pressure or actual self-centered interests--for men to be given and accept "early-release" may never be known. However, a common interpretation is essential for all U.S. military entering into a POW situation.

Article V

Article V of the Code has caused concern ever since its conception and promulgation. It has been discussed earlier in this report. Chapter II indicates the intentions of the framers of the Code and Chapter IV discusses the application of this article. But, the problem lies in the various interpretations of this article by the Services--some insisting on "big-four" only and one (the U.S. Air Force) recognizing the intent of the framers of the Code and teaching more realistically that intent.

³Supra, pp. 70-71.

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The U.S. Navy, in General Order No. 4, recognizes that a POW may be forced to go beyond the "big-four" response when physical or mental torture or other coercion is used.⁴ Yet how to handle that situation is not considered in Navy training.

The POW in Vietnam found through experience that he could be forced to give information.⁵ Therefore, this fact should be recognized in the wording of the Code. Neither the writers nor other respondents to the "Survey" feel that once one is a POW he is not responsible for his actions, and can say anything he feels. Rather, one should not give information of his own free will as long as his physical and mental faculties are not endangered. It was found in North Vietnam that it was prudent to stop resistance against giving information before one lost his mental faculties. Invariably, by holding out too long, the loss of mental faculties often resulted in the Vietnamese obtaining more than they originally desired.

Thomas E. Wolters suggests the following approach to reword Article V:

When questioned, should I become a prisoner of war, I am required to give my name, rank, service number, and date of birth. To the utmost of my ability, I will evade answering further questions or making

⁴U.S., Department of the Navy, General Order No. 4, Code of Conduct for Members of the Armed Forces of the United States (Washington, D.C.: 1957), Article V, pp. 2-3.

⁵Supra, pp. 50-55.

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oral or written statements disloyal to my country and its allies or harmful to their cause.⁶

Question E-28 from Table 5-1 indicates there were other areas of the Code that need changing that are not covered in Table 5-1. A space was provided in the "Survey" for write-in answers to amplify comments with regard to these other changes. In general, it was found that these comments again followed four primary concerns: (1) Escape, (2) Hard-line only, (3) Standardization, and (4) Need for "enforcement" (i. e., legal teeth for enforcement of the Code). The latter two categories fall into an area the writers consider Code-related matters.

Deficiencies in Code-Related Matters

This is an area of great concern, both to the writers of this report and to other POWs. Within it shall be considered two primary factors: (1) The need for a common interpretation of the Code, and (2) The need of a more definitive legal status to the Code, including the authority of the SRO in a POW camp situation.

Commonality

The range of responses to the statement, "The Code should be uniformly interpreted for all Services," was 1.64

⁶Thomas E. Wolters, "The Code of Conduct--Its Relevancy and Validity: 1955-1970" (thesis, George Washington University, 1971), p. 87.

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percent "disagreement"; 2.30 percent "neither agree nor disagree"; 33.11 percent "agree"; and 62.95 percent "strongly agree."⁷ Considering the differences in interpretation, training, and application discussed in Chapters II and III of this report, it is apparent that the former POW feels there should be a standard DOD position concerning these most important areas.

With respect to Article V in particular, the panel of former Army POWs stated, "It is unrealistic to assume that a man can go 'X' years repeating the 'big-four' . . ."⁸ Yet that is not how the Code is written; Article V goes on to say, "I will evade answering further questions to the best of my ability."⁹

The Army briefing group goes as far as to state:

. . . We would like to recommend the following:
 . . . That one manual be provided for all Services to insure consistent interpretation of the Code. We further recommend that lesson plans be prepared in narrative form to provide uniformity in training.¹⁰

Legality

The respondents' interpretation of the legal status of the Code is varied in distribution. In response to the statement, "The Code is legally binding," 46.86 percent "disagree," 15.51 percent "neither agree nor disagree," and 37.62 percent "agree."

⁷"Survey": Question E-24.

⁸Supra, p. 49.

⁹Appendix 1, Article V.

¹⁰"Army Briefing": p. 10.

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The individual's interpretation of this legality was obviously an influence on how some POWs responded to the Code and to policy set by the SRO. The data in Table 5-2 delineate the reasons for possible infractions of POW intra-organizational discipline caused by uncertainty of the legality of the Code.

From the data in Table 5-2, it appears that it was not so much the question of legal status of the SRO, but rather, the doubt that legal action would be taken, or if taken, that it would be upheld.

The respondents to the "Survey" were rather indecisive on another series of questions regarding authority in the POW camps. The statement, "An SRO needs more authority to maintain discipline in a POW camp," brought the following distribution of answers: "Strongly disagree," 9.51 percent; "disagree," 29.84 percent; "neither agree nor disagree," 21.64 percent; "agree," 28.20 percent; and "strongly agree," 10.82 percent.¹¹ The next statement, "The UCMJ provides sufficient authority for an SRO to maintain discipline," was answered as follows: "Strongly disagree," 8.58 percent; "disagree," 22.44 percent; "neither agree nor disagree," 15.18 percent; "agree," 40.26 percent; and "strongly agree," 13.53 percent.¹²

¹¹"Survey": Question E-11.

¹²Ibid., Question E-12.

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TABLE 5-2
POW VIEWS ON LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF INFRACTIONS
OF INTRA-ORGANIZATIONAL DISCIPLINE

Question	Most Probable			Least Probable	
	A	B	C	D	
Doubt that court-martial action would be taken	29.14	37.09	23.18	10.60	
Doubt that even if court-martial action taken, a conviction could be obtained	28.38	40.59	21.45	9.57	83
Consequences of a court-martial preferable to enduring conditions then prevailing	23.50	9.27	34.77	32.45	
Legal constitution of authority open for debate	13.86	11.55	19.14	55.45	

NOTE: Numbers represent percent of respondents.

SOURCE: "Survey": Questions E-7-10.

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However, in a detached command such as a POW camp, it is essential that there be no question about the command structure or the SRO's authority. An SRO must have the authority to set policy--within the framework of the Code--unique to the situation, to discipline those who disobey and reward those worthy of commendation.

In response to the statement, "The Code should be legally binding by reference to it in the UCMJ," a distribution of answers was as follows: "Strongly disagree," 6.91 percent; "disagree," 20.72 percent; "neither agree nor disagree," 14.14 percent; "agree," 31.91 percent; and "strongly agree," 26.32 percent.¹³

Whether the UCMJ is the proper legally-binding source document is debatable and not considered in this report. However, it is felt that there must be some generally-recognized legal status providing "teeth" to the authority of the SRO over all other POWs regardless of their Service. In a detached POW camp the SRO has no line of communication to a higher authority; he must be a law unto himself, and his men must recognize this.

Other Comments on Deficiencies in the Code and Related Activities

In response to a survey conducted by the writers among former Vietnam War POWs in attendance at ICAF and

¹³Ibid., Question E-23.

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NWC, six former POWs commented on deficiencies in the Code and related activities:

Captain William Lawrence, USN:

. . . It is felt that the Code is adequate in its present form. Further, it serves as a good basic document which POW leaders can use in preparing more specific policies to govern their particular camp situation.

Commander Raymond Vohden, USN:

I believe the COC served us well. It provided the basic fundamentals for POW behavior. Although many similarities existed between the Korean War, Pueblo incident and the Vietnam War, there were sufficient dissimilarities which will always require on-the-scene interpretation and adjustment to meet the conditions that exist.

A solution to the rank problem should be found.

Captain James Mehl, USN:

. . . I think there should be a standard interpretation of the Code for all Services, under all conditions, if that's possible. That's the guts of the problem--interpretation.

Colonel William Burroughs, USAF:

I heartily approve of the Code and its demands. Perhaps its legality in military law should be elucidated.

There are definitions in the Code that need greater training to be understood by the majority of men: "parole" and "special favors" especially.

Colonel D. Dutton, USAF:

I do not think the COC should be changed. Maybe make an interpretation of exactly what parole, special favor, and escape entail. Then teach it! And enforce it!!!

Colonel Samuel Johnson, USAF:

I think the Code is a great document and guide. It is written in general terms that allows for on the spot

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interpretations as required. I think it allows for a position other than holding to name, rank, etc. I feel the legitimacy of command needs to be established by some reference or tie with the UCMJ. Perhaps some clarification of circumstances of escape It is merely the interpretation that needs emphasis.

From the foregoing discussion in this chapter, it can be determined that in the minds of some POWs there are deficiencies in the Code and Code-related activities. Clarification of some of the descriptive narrative in the Code is necessary, along with a possible rewording of Article V of the Code. In the area of Code-related activities, a uniform interpretation and consistent training by the various Services are essential to uniform application of its principles. In addition, the legality of the Code and the related area of the SRO authority are in question.

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CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

The return of American servicemen from the cells and cages of Vietnamese POW camps has brought forth a renewal of the outcries against the Armed Forces Code of Conduct. These POWs constitute the first real test of this controversial military ethic. In their experiences can be found the answers to questions about the validity of the Code.

The background that brought about the formulation of the Code is discussed in Chapter II of this report. The underlying motives and the intentions of the framers of the Code are explained. Chapter III examines each Service's program of training to explain and demonstrate the principles set forth in the Code.

The POWs had ample opportunity to apply these principles in the Vietnamese POW camps. Chapters IV and V analyze the utilization and validity of the Code as shown in the POWs' responses to the Code-related questions in the Survey of Returned POWs, in the statements contained in the Army debriefing paper, and in the responses to a survey conducted among

POWs attending the National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. These analyses determine the value of the Code in actual application--i.e., when utilized in the situation for which it was designed. The same source materials also are analyzed to determine if there are deficiencies in the Code and in Code-related activities.

The examinations and analyses in the preceding chapters provide sufficient data to respond conclusively first to the subsidiary questions and then to the primary research question.

Conclusions

Subsidiary Question 1

Why was the Code formulated, and what were the intentions of its writers?

It is concluded that the Code was formulated by responsible Americans as the Department of Defense answer to the widespread public concern over the misconduct of a few American POWs during the Korean conflict. The principles embodied in the Code are based upon traditional concepts of what is expected of warriors when they continue to serve their country after capture. The framers of the Code had three primary intentions:

1. To insure the National Security of the United States.
2. To enhance the POW's chances for survival.

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3. To prevent the recurrence of POW misconduct in future conflicts.

Subsidiary Question 2

Was training in the Code adequate before and during the Vietnam War?

It is concluded that training in the Code prior to and during the Vietnam conflict was inadequate. This was true even for the unusual combat situation in Vietnam, where the great majority of military personnel who became POWs were career-minded officers. It would be especially true for a combat situation where enlisted personnel who had been drafted became the majority of a large number of POWs.

Initial (school) and continuation (unit) training in the Code was provided by all four Services. All too often, however, the unit training programs were mediocre, poorly supervised, and only partially effective. Nearly every POW was familiar to some degree with the Code and made use, when possible, of the little bit of training he had received or could remember. Yet, that was woefully inadequate. Not one POW could be found in all of the prison camps of North Vietnam who could recite verbatim the Code's six articles, much less the all-important instructional material which accompanied and explained each article. This lack of certain knowledge of the Code was a definite handicap to the American POW in Vietnam. He wanted to thwart his captor's efforts to exploit him but could not be sure if he was

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doing enough or too much according to the Code. The worry and uncertainty thus generated proved detrimental to his morale. For the Code to be truly effective in the situation for which it was written, every potential POW must be thoroughly familiar not only with the six articles but also with the accompanying instructional material.

Research into the training provided by the Services prior to and during the Vietnam conflict brought to light an important flaw in that training, other than the conclusion drawn above as to its inadequacy. The basic intention of the most controversial clause of the Code, Article V, was misinterpreted and misapplied in training--apparently knowingly--by the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. Further, this misinterpretation and misapplication has been, since the inception of the Code, the cause for the controversy over Article V and, thus, over the Code itself. And this controversy carried over into the POW camps of Vietnam, causing dissension among POWs and friction within the POW organization. To prevent this in the future, it is absolutely essential that one interpretation be applied and taught in all Services.

Subsidiary Question 3

How was the Code utilized in Vietnam--was it of value, or was it detrimental?

It is concluded that the Code was of tremendous value to the POW in Vietnam. It was the military ethic by which he

lived and conducted his perpetual battle against his captor's attempts at exploitation. In effect, the Code became sort of a military Ten Commandments to the POW. He was not always able to abide by its provisions but he always tried to do so. The POWs in Vietnam determined that the Code was not so binding that it could not be modified to fit specific circumstances if the need arose--and it did. Because the Code established fundamental objectives for the POWs, it provided a mind- and life-saving commonality of purpose. For the most part, the POWs achieved the purpose for which the Code was written. In so doing, they returned home with honor.

Subsidiary Question 4

Are there deficiencies in the Code and in Code-related activities?

It is concluded that deficiencies do exist in the Code and in Code-related activities.

The deficiency in the Code lies in Article V. The portion of Article V which reads, "I will make no oral or written statements . . ." is unrealistic. A captor can obtain, if he is determined to do so, such a statement from a POW. And when that happens, the POW who has been trying to abide by the Code feels a tremendous sense of guilt for his failure. In at least one known case in Vietnam, a POW¹ tried to commit suicide because

¹Name withheld out of consideration for feelings of family.

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
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
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of such guilt feelings. It is not known whether he eventually succeeded. He did not return, and his name was on the North Vietnamese list of POWs who died while held. All that should be required by the Code is that the POW do his utmost to avoid answering questions beyond the "big four" or making oral or written statements against his country or allies.

There are two basic deficiencies in Code-related activities of the Services:

1. Article V of the Code was misinterpreted and misapplied by three of the four Services, to the detriment of individual POWs and the POW organization in Vietnam. This has been discussed under the conclusion for Subsidiary Question 2 and needs no further elaboration.

2. There is considerable uncertainty within the Services as to the scope and legality of the authority of the Senior Ranking Officer (SRO) in a POW situation. This uncertainty was reflected in the POWs' views on the subject while still in Vietnam. As a result, the command structure of the POW organization in North Vietnam was weakened seriously. The SRO's responsibility is specified in paragraph 3, Article IV, of the Code. He needs legal, unquestioned authority to carry out that responsibility.

Each of these two deficiencies is important. Each must be corrected if the Code is to play the role for which it was designed.

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Primary Research Question

Is the Armed Forces Code of Conduct a viable standard for use in future armed conflicts, or should it be changed, and, if so, how?

It is concluded that the Armed Forces Code of Conduct, as presently written, is a viable standard for military conduct in combat or in captivity within the foreseeable future. However, the Code can be improved greatly with only minor changes. This should be done if the Code is to be as effective as it can be, and as it originally was intended to be.

More important than changes to the Code itself, there are other actions which should be taken:

1. A central military interpretation of the controversial clauses of the Code should be published by the appropriate authority in a document which is binding upon all branches of Service. This should include requirements for commonality of training among the Services. Ideally, it would specify the establishment of a Defense SERE School, which would replace the various SERE and survival schools now operated by the Services.
2. The legality of the authority of the SRO and of the command structure of the POW organization must be established firmly and clearly, once and for all.

Recommendations

The Armed Forces Code of Conduct is a basic structure for the combat soldier or the POW to utilize or build upon

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according to the need. To change the Code because POW experiences in Vietnam were different from POW experiences in Korea would seem to invite changes after each varied experience. And changes made often or lightly would weaken the Code. However, the Code was formulated as a result of POW experiences in Korea, and the POW experiences in Vietnam were the first real test of its value. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to expect changes to the Code as a result of what was learned in Vietnam. In the paragraphs to follow, specific recommendations are made for pertinent changes to the Code or Code-related activities.

1. Realities of past and (probable) future treatment of American POWs must be considered along with the need for consistent and meaningful background training to help prepare the potential POW to uphold the ideals and requirements of the Code. Therefore, it is recommended that Article V of the Code be changed to read:

When questioned, should I become a prisoner of war, I am bound to give only my name, rank, service number, and date of birth. To the utmost of my ability, I will evade answering further questions and making oral or written statements disloyal to my country and its allies or harmful to their cause.

The instructional material in support of Article V should be changed to reflect the wording of the proposed revision to Article V.

2. It is absolutely essential to provide commonality of Code training for all of the Services. The varied interpretations

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and training methods used by the Services were detrimental to POWs as they intermingled with POWs from other Services. To correct this deficiency, it is recommended that the Department of Defense:

a. Publish a simple, clear-cut interpretation of the Code, in a manner which makes that interpretation binding upon all the Services.

b. Establish an Authority within the Department of Defense to centralize and supervise SERE training for all Services. The lack of central supervision of SERE training has been a recurring criticism since the Code came into being.

3. The SRO in a POW camp must have unquestioned authority over all those junior to him, regardless of branch of Service, to be able to carry out the responsibility placed upon him by the Code. Therefore, it is necessary that philosophical differences between the Services regarding command authority be resolved as soon as possible. Especially detrimental for the future is the current Army position that members of that Service are not subject to the authority of members of other Services unless a specific chain-of-command is established. Not only does this concept run counter to long-established domestic and international military tradition, but also the requirement for a specific chain-of-command is almost impossible to achieve in certain POW situations, such as the isolation phase of captivity. The Vietnam POW experience proved that even in that phase

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some communication was possible between isolated POWs, although often not enough to establish a campwide command structure. Unity among POWs is absolutely necessary to thwart the aims of the enemy against them and their country. To this most important end, once the question of seniority of rank is settled between two or more POWs, there must be no questioning of authority of the senior POW. Therefore, it is recommended that a legally binding document be published either by the President or the Secretary of Defense, to specify:

a. That the authority of the SRO in a POW camp or organization extends over all other American prisoners in that camp or organization.

b. that rank structure in a POW camp or organization applies uniformly throughout all Services, whether or not a formal chain-of-command has been established.

c. that the provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) apply to infractions of discipline among POWs just as surely as to violations of Service regulations that occur among non-POWs.

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APPENDIX 1

CODE OF CONDUCT FOR MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES

1. The following executive order and the Code of Conduct for Members of the Armed Forces of the United States established thereby are in effect:

"EXECUTIVE ORDER 10631

"CODE OF CONDUCT FOR MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES

"By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, and as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, I hereby prescribe the Code of Conduct for Members of the Armed Forces of the United States which is attached to this order and hereby made a part thereof.

"Every member of the Armed Forces of the United States is expected to measure up to the standards embodied in this Code of Conduct while he is in combat or in captivity. To insure achievement of these standards, each member of the Armed Forces liable to capture shall be provided with specific training and instruction designed to better equip him to counter and withstand all enemy efforts against him, and shall be fully instructed as to the behavior and obligations expected of him during combat or captivity.

"The Secretary of Defense (and the Secretary of the Treasury with respect to the Coast Guard, except when it is serving as part of the Navy) shall take such action as is deemed necessary to implement this order and to disseminate and make the said Code known to all members of the Armed Forces of the United States.

"Dwight D. Eisenhower

"THE WHITE HOUSE

"August 17, 1955"

Code of Conduct for Members of the Armed Forces
of the United States

I

I AM AN AMERICAN FIGHTING MAN. I SERVE IN THE FORCES WHICH GUARD MY COUNTRY AND OUR WAY OF LIFE. I AM PREPARED TO GIVE MY LIFE IN THEIR DEFENSE.

A member of the Armed Forces is always a fighting man. As such, it is his duty to oppose the enemies of the United States regardless of the circumstances in which he may find himself, whether in active participation in combat, or as a prisoner of war.

II

I WILL NEVER SURRENDER OF MY OWN FREE WILL. IF IN COMMAND I WILL NEVER SURRENDER MY MEN WHILE THEY STILL HAVE THE MEANS TO RESIST.

As an individual, a member of the Armed Forces may never voluntarily surrender himself. When isolated and he can no longer inflict casualties on the enemy, it is his duty to evade capture and rejoin the nearest friendly forces.

The responsibility and authority of a commander never extends to the surrender of his command to the enemy while it has power to resist or evade. When isolated, cut off, or surrounded, a unit must continue to fight until relieved, or able to rejoin friendly forces, by breaking out or by evading the enemy.

III

IF I AM CAPTURED I WILL CONTINUE TO RESIST BY ALL MEANS AVAILABLE. I WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO ESCAPE AND AID OTHERS TO ESCAPE. I WILL ACCEPT NEITHER PAROLE NOR SPECIAL FAVORS FROM THE ENEMY.

The duty of a member of the Armed Forces to continue resistance by all means at his disposal is not lessened by the misfortune of capture. Article 82 of the Geneva Convention pertains and must be explained. He will escape if able to do so, and will assist others to escape. Parole agreements are promises given the captor by a prisoner of war upon his faith and honor, to fulfill stated conditions, such as not to bear arms or not to escape, in consideration of

special privileges, usually release from captivity or a lessened restraint. He will never sign or enter into a parole agreement.

IV

IF I BECOME A PRISONER OF WAR, I WILL KEEP FAITH WITH MY FELLOW PRISONERS. I WILL GIVE NO INFORMATION OR TAKE PART IN ANY ACTION WHICH MIGHT BE HARMFUL TO MY COMRADES. IF I AM SENIOR, I WILL TAKE COMMAND. IF NOT I WILL OBEY THE LAWFUL ORDERS OF THOSE APPOINTED OVER ME AND WILL BACK THEM UP IN EVERY WAY.

Informing or any other action to the detriment of a fellow prisoner is despicable and is expressly forbidden. Prisoners of war must avoid helping the enemy identify fellow prisoners who may have knowledge of particular value to the enemy, and may therefore be made to suffer coercive interrogation.

Strong leadership is essential to discipline. Without discipline, camp organization, resistance, and even survival may be impossible. Personal hygiene, camp sanitation, and care of sick and wounded are imperative. Officers and noncommissioned officers of the United States will continue to carry out their responsibilities and exercise their authority subsequent to capture. The senior line officer or noncommissioned officer within the prisoner of war camp or group of prisoners will assume command according to rank (or precedence) without regard to Service. This responsibility and accountability may not be evaded. If the senior officer or noncommissioned officer is incapacitated or unable to act for any reason, command will be assumed by the next senior. If the foregoing organization cannot be effected, an organization of elected representatives, as provided for in Articles 79-81 Geneva Convention Relative to Treatment of Prisoners of War, or a covert organization, or both, will be formed.

V

WHEN QUESTIONED, SHOULD I BECOME A PRISONER OF WAR, I AM BOUND TO GIVE ONLY NAME, RANK, SERVICE NUMBER, AND DATE OF BIRTH. I WILL EVADE ANSWERING FURTHER QUESTIONS TO THE UTMOST OF MY ABILITY. I WILL MAKE NO ORAL OR WRITTEN STATEMENTS DISLOYAL

TO MY COUNTRY AND ITS ALLIES OR HARMFUL TO THEIR CAUSE.

When questioned, a prisoner of war is required by the Geneva Convention and permitted by this Code to disclose his name, rank, service number, and date of birth. A prisoner of war may also communicate with the enemy regarding his individual health or welfare as a prisoner of war and, when appropriate, on routine matters of camp administration. Oral or written confessions true or false, questionnaires, personal history statements, propaganda recordings and broadcasts, appeals to other prisoners of war, signatures to peace or surrender appeals, self criticisms or any other oral or written communication on behalf of the enemy or critical or harmful to the United States, its allies, the Armed Forces or other prisoners are forbidden.

It is a violation of the Geneva Convention to place a prisoner of war under physical or mental torture or any other form of coercion to secure from him information of any kind. If, however, a prisoner is subjected to such treatment, he will endeavor to avoid by every means the disclosure of any information, or the making of any statement or the performance of any action harmful to the interests of the United States or its allies or which will provide aid or comfort to the enemy.

Under Communist Bloc reservations to the Geneva Convention, the signing of a confession or the making of a statement by a prisoner is likely to be used to convict him as a war criminal under the laws of his captors. This conviction has the effect of removing him from the prisoner of war status and according to this Communist Bloc device denying him any protection under terms of the Geneva Convention and repatriation until a prison sentence is served.

VI

I WILL NEVER FORGET THAT I AM AN AMERICAN FIGHTING MAN, RESPONSIBLE FOR MY ACTIONS, AND DEDICATED TO THE PRINCIPLES WHICH MADE MY COUNTRY FREE. I WILL TRUST IN MY GOD AND IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

The provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, whenever appropriate, continue to apply to members of the Armed Forces while prisoners of war. Upon repatriation, the conduct of prisoners

will be examined as to the circumstances of capture and through the period of detention with due regard for the rights of the individual and consideration for the conditions of captivity. A member of the Armed Forces who becomes a prisoner of war has a continuing obligation to remain loyal to his country, his Service and his unit.


The life of a prisoner of war is hard. He must never give up hope. He must resist enemy indoctrination. Prisoners of war who stand firm and united against the enemy will aid one another in surviving this ordeal.

Appendix II

SURVEY OF RETURNED PRISONERS OF WAR

**OFFICIAL USE
ONLY**

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY



**SURVEY OF
RETURNED
PRISONERS OF WAR**

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SURVEY OF RETURNED PRISONERS OF WAR
January 1974

PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE ANSWERING THE SURVEY.

Your participation in this survey is voluntary. All responses will be anonymous. Analysis of the results of this survey will be based upon tabulations of the total number of responses.

If you will thoughtfully respond, this survey will become one of the most valuable sources of information for study of the Southeast Asia captivity experience, primarily because all returnees may now be asked the same questions in the same way. It is also a further opportunity to candidly express your opinions and describe your experience.

The survey packet contains a questionnaire, eight answer sheets, a pencil, and a pre-addressed return envelope. If you are a USAF aircrew member, an additional questionnaire is included.

Please mark your answers on the answer sheets provided. Some questions call for fill-in responses. If you select a fill-in response, mark your answer sheet with the letter corresponding to the fill-in and then print your reply in the space provided. Should you desire to give a narrative response, use a plain sheet of paper and identify that response with the section and question number.


Follow the instructions in the questionnaire. Use a different answer sheet for each section of the survey. Be sure to mark question 1 in each section as indicated. Select only one answer to each question. Please use only the number two pencil provided to mark your answer sheet. Be sure to mark your answers carefully so that you enter them opposite the answer sheet number which corresponds to the survey question number.

Be sure that your answer marks are heavy and black. Blacken the whole rectangle but stay within the rectangle lines.

**RIGHT WAY
TO MARK
ANSWER SHEET**



**WRONG WAY
TO MARK
ANSWER SHEET**



IMPORTANT

Do not put your Social Security Account Number (SSAN) on the front side of your answer sheet, even though the answer sheet provides space for it.

Please do not mark in the preprinted number boxes on each side of your answer sheet. These numbers are used by the electronic scanner to match the front and back of your answer sheet. Those are not identification numbers to link responses to individuals.

Please complete and return this survey within two weeks of receipt, if at all possible.

If you have any questions concerning this survey, please contact:

USAF Military Survey Program (HQ USAF ACMR)
Washington, DC 20330
Telephone:
Autovon: 227-5845
Commercial: OX7-5845

MAILING INSTRUCTIONS:

When you complete the survey, place all eight answer sheets inside the front cover of the booklet and mail the booklet and answer sheets in the envelope provided. Please do not mail answer sheets in separately. Inventory the contents before you mail your return envelope. Be certain that you are returning the booklet(s) and eight answer sheets. Be sure the envelope is well sealed before mailing.

THANK YOU

Section A

To be completed by everyone.

1. Mark the response "A" opposite item 1 on your answer sheet.
2. Where did you first attend survival, resistance, and evasion and escape training?
 - A. Stead AFB
 - B. Fairchild AFB
 - C. Jungle Survival (Philippines)
 - D. Jungle Survival (Panama)
 - E. USAF Academy
 - F. Pensacola
 - G. Brunswick
 - H. North Island
 - I. Fort Rucker
 - J. Other Army (please specify): _____
 - K. Other (please specify): _____
 - L. Did not have this training
3. What year did you attend the above school?

A. 1972	E. 1968	I. 1964	M. 1960 or earlier
B. 1971	F. 1967	J. 1963	N. Never had the training
C. 1970	G. 1966	K. 1962	
D. 1969	H. 1965	L. 1961	
4. Did you attend another survival, resistance, or evasion and escape school in addition to the above? (Use the same list and codes as in question 2 above.)
5. What year did you attend this other school? (Use the codes shown in question 3.)
6. Did you attend more than two schools for survival, resistance, and evasion and escape training?
 - A. Yes (please specify): _____
 - B. No
7. How often do you think survival, resistance and evasion and escape training should be given?
 - A. Once every 2 years
 - B. Once every 3 years
 - C. Just prior to combat theatre assignment
 - D. Periodically during combat theatre assignment
 - E. Other (specify): _____
8. What type of survival, resistance and evasion and escape schooling do you prefer?
 - A. Basic "global concept" school only
 - B. Combat theatre oriented school only
 - C. Wing, squadron, battalion-level schooling only
 - D. A & B only
 - E. A, B, & C

9. What, in your view, is the most effective learning situation for survival training?
- A. Audio/visual assisted lectures and reading
 - B. "Laboratory" practice and experience
 - C. Filmed and staged simulations
 - D. Small-group discussion or seminar
 - E. Field training in combat theatre-like locale
 - F. Self-study
 - G. Other (specify) _____
10. What, in your view, is the most effective learning situation for resistance training? (Use the codes shown in question 9 above.)
11. What, in your view, is the most effective learning situation for evasion and escape training? (Use the codes shown in question 9 above.)
12. Should survival, resistance, and evasion and escape training be given to trainees?
- A. With advance warning for a known duration
 - B. Without warning and for an unknown duration

With respect to in-service training or education, rate the following:

	<u>Very</u> <u>Unimportant</u>	<u>Somewhat</u> <u>Unimportant</u>	<u>Neither</u> <u>Unimportant</u> <u>Nor</u> <u>Important</u>	<u>Somewhat</u> <u>Important</u>	<u>Very</u> <u>Important</u>
13. Rescue vectoring and location techniques	A	B	C	D	E
14. Adapting to local conditions	A	B	C	D	E
15. Inventing or improvising survival equipment	A	B	C	D	E
16. Building survival shelters	A	B	C	D	E
17. Identifying food sources	A	B	C	D	E
18. Prepare food	A	B	C	D	E
19. Purifying or locating water	A	B	C	D	E
20. Using camouflage and concealment	A	B	C	D	E
21. Travel orientation	A	B	C	D	E

	<u>Very Unimportant</u>	<u>Somewhat Unimportant</u>	<u>Neither Unimportant Nor Important</u>	<u>Somewhat Important</u>	<u>Very Important</u>
22. Medicine and hygiene	A	B	C	D	E
23. Using evasion and escape equipment	A	B	C	D	E

Please rate your combat unit training program for survival, resistance, and evasion and escape training, in relation to the realities of captivity.

For example: The following series of adjectives are arranged so that the opposite of the adjective on the left appears in the column to the right. Five options of response are offered. Select your response in relation to the adjective you prefer.

Good A B C D E Bad

If you prefer a response which is more "good" than "bad", select "A" or "B." If you prefer a response that is more "bad" than "good", choose "D" or "E." If you have no preference, choose "C."

24. Adequate	A	B	C	D	E	Inadequate
25. Pertinent	A	B	C	D	E	Not pertinent
26. Created confidence	A	B	C	D	E	Created apprehension
27. Detailed	A	B	C	D	E	Cursory
28. Mandatory	A	B	C	D	E	Optional
29. Frequent	A	B	C	D	E	Infrequent

Characterize your unit survival, evasion and escape, and resistance training program before you were taken into captivity by reacting to the following statements:

	<u>Never</u>	<u>Seldom</u>	<u>Sometimes</u>	<u>Usually</u>	<u>Always</u>
30. Training was carefully presented and informative	A	B	C	D	E
31. Unit training was consistent with my basic survival, evasion and escape, and resistance training	A	B	C	D	E
32. Training was frivolous and there was "horsing around"	A	B	C	D	E
33. Training was highly regarded	A	B	C	D	E

- | | <u>Never</u> | <u>Seldom</u> | <u>Sometimes</u> | <u>Usually</u> | <u>Always</u> |
|--|--------------|---------------|------------------|----------------|---------------|
| 34. I believe my training was consistent with other Services | A | B | C | D | E |
| 35. What is your Service affiliation? | | | | | |
| A. US Army | | | | | |
| B. US Navy | | | | | |
| C. US Air Force | | | | | |
| D. US Marine Corps | | | | | |
| E. Civilian | | | | | |

Please continue with Section B

Section B

To be completed by everyone.

1. Using a new answer sheet, mark response "B" opposite item 1.

2. How old were you when taken into captivity?

- | | | | |
|-----------------|----------|----------|----------|
| A. Less than 19 | C. 25-29 | E. 35-39 | G. 45-49 |
| B. 20-24 | D. 30-34 | F. 40-44 | |

3. How many months were you held in captivity?

- | | | | |
|--------------|----------|----------|------------|
| A. 5 or less | E. 24-29 | I. 48-53 | M. 72-77 |
| B. 6-11 | F. 30-35 | J. 54-59 | N. 78-83 |
| C. 12-17 | G. 36-41 | K. 60-65 | O. 84-89 |
| D. 18-23 | H. 42-47 | L. 66-71 | P. Over 89 |

4. What is your highest level of education now?

- A. Attended grammar school
- B. Grammar school graduate (no high school)
- C. Attended high school
- D. High school graduate (including accepted GED credits)
- E. Trade or technical school graduate
- F. Some college, but less than one year
- G. One year of college, but less than two
- H. Junior college graduate (with Associate degree)
- I. Two years of college, but less than three
- J. Three years or more of college without degree
- K. College degree (B.A. or B.S.)
- L. Graduate or graduate of fifth year work without Masters
- M. Masters degree
- N. Graduate work beyond Masters degree
- O. Doctorate or professional equivalent

5. If you attended college, please indicate your major field of interest.

- A. Anthropology, political science, philosophy, psychology, sociology, economics, geography, history, business administration (liberal arts)
- B. Physics, chemistry, engineering, biological sciences (sciences and engineering)
- C. Architecture, medicine, law, education (the professions)
- D. Industrial arts, commercial art, clerical or programmer training, mechanics, retail/wholesale trade (vocational education)
- E. Other (please specify) _____
- F. Not applicable. I have never attended college

6. What was your active duty grade at time of capture?

- | | | | |
|---------------|--------|---------------|------------------|
| A. E-1 or E-2 | E. E-6 | I. WO | M. O-5 |
| B. E-3 | F. E-7 | J. O-1 or O-2 | N. O-6 and above |
| C. E-4 | G. E-8 | K. O-3 | O. Civilian |
| D. E-5 | H. E-9 | L. O-4 | |

7. What is your current grade?

- | | | | |
|---------------|--------|---------------|------------------|
| A. E-1 or E-2 | E. E-6 | I. WO | M. O-5 |
| B. E-3 | F. E-7 | J. O-1 or O-2 | N. O-6 and above |
| C. E-4 | G. E-8 | K. O-3 | O. Civilian |
| D. E-5 | H. E-9 | L. O-4 | |

8. Please give your marital status at time of capture.

- | | |
|------------------|---|
| A. Never married | E. Divorced |
| B. Engaged | F. Remarried after divorce or death of wife |
| C. Married | G. Widower |
| D. Separated | |

9. Please give your marital status now.

- | | |
|------------------|---|
| A. Never married | E. Divorced |
| B. Engaged | F. Remarried after divorce or death of wife |
| C. Married | G. Widower |
| D. Separated | |

10. Family status at time of capture?

- A. Dependent wife only
- B. Dependent wife and child/children
- C. Dependent parents or relatives only
- D. Dependent wife and/or children and parents or relatives
- E. Dependent child/children only (specify number _____)
- F. None of the above

11. Where were you held captive?

- A. North Vietnam only
- B. North and South Vietnam/Cambodia
- C. South Vietnam/Cambodia only
- D. North Vietnam/Laos

12. Is it your impression that you were subjected to more or less intensive questioning than the typical prisoner?

- A. More
- B. About the same
- C. Less

From your personal experience, what methods were used by the captor for interrogation/exploitation before the start of regular prison routine.

	<u>Not Used</u>	<u>Used</u>
13. Threat	A	B
14. Fear	A	B
15. Direct questions for information	A	B
16. Humiliation/degradation	A	B
17. Making PW uncertain of his fate	A	B
18. Deception or trickery	A	B
19. Emotional appeal	A	B
20. Confronting PW with information about him or his fellow PWs	A	B

	<u>Not Used</u>	<u>Used</u>
21. Application of "significant pain" in physical mistreatment	A	B
22. Physical mistreatment <u>without</u> "significant pain"	A	B
23. Withholding medical attention	A	B
24. Withholding food or water	A	B
25. Friendliness or sympathy	A	B
26. Accusation of "crime"	A	B
27. Alternately threatening and friendly	A	B
28. Promises of leniency or amnesty	A	B
29. Attempted or actual blackmail	A	B
30. Offers of food or drink	A	B
31. Offers of women	A	B
32. Offers of early release	A	B
33. Offers of special privileges	A	B
34. Used non-interrogator (i.e., journalist, doctor, or clergyman) to seek information	A	B
35. Playing upon PW's shock or despair at being captured	A	B

How effective were those methods of interrogation/exploitation before the start of regular prison routine in causing you to comply with the captor's demands?

	<u>Not Ap- plicable (Not Used)</u>	<u>Very In- effec- tive</u>	<u>Some- what In- effec- tive</u>	<u>Neither Ineffec- tive nor Effective</u>	<u>Some- what Effec- tive</u>	<u>Very Effec- tive</u>
36. Threat	A	B	C	D	E	F
37. Fear	A	B	C	D	E	F
38. Direct questions for information	A	B	C	D	E	F

	<u>Not Ap- plicable (Not Used)</u>	<u>Very In- effec- tive</u>	<u>Some- what In- effec- tive</u>	<u>Neither Ineffec- tive nor Effective</u>	<u>Some- what Effec- tive</u>	<u>Very Effec- tive</u>
39. Humiliation/ degradation	A	B	C	D	E	F
40. Making PW uncer- tain of his fate	A	B	C	D	E	F
41. Deception or trickery	A	B	C	D	E	F
42. Emotional appeal	A	B	C	D	E	F
43. Confronting PW with information about him or his fellow PWs	A	B	C	D	E	F
44. Application of "significant pain" in physical mis- treatment.	A	B	C	D	E	F
45. Physical mistreat- ment without "significant pain"	A	B	C	D	E	F
46. Withholding medical attention	A	B	C	D	E	F
47. Withholding food or water	A	B	C	D	E	F
48. Friendliness or sympathy	A	B	C	D	E	F
49. Accusation of "crime"	A	B	C	D	E	F
50. Alternately threat- ening and friendly	A	B	C	D	E	F
51. Promises of leniency or amnesty	A	B	C	D	E	F
52. Attempted or actual blackmail	A	B	C	D	E	F
53. Offers of food or drink	A	B	C	D	E	F

	<u>Not Ap- plicable (Not Used)</u>	<u>Very In- effec- tive</u>	<u>Some- what In- effec- tive</u>	<u>Neither Ineffec- tive nor Effective</u>	<u>Some- what Effec- tive</u>	<u>Very Effec- tive</u>
54. Offers of women	A	B	C	D	E	F
55. Offers of early release	A	B	C	D	E	F
56. Offers of special privileges	A	B	C	D	E	F
57. Used non-interrogator (i.e., journalist, doctor, or clergyman) to seek information	A	B	C	D	E	F
58. Playing upon PW's shock or despair at being captured	A	B	C	D	E	F
59. Other _____	A	B	C	D	E	F

Based upon your personal experience, what were the captor's interests during initial stages (before regular prison routine began) of captivity?

	<u>No Interest</u>	<u>Minor Interest</u>	<u>Major Interest</u>
60. Information on identification of aircraft or equipment, unit, other military personnel	A	B	C
61. Information on targets or tactical objective, battle tactics	A	B	C
62. Technical information on weapons systems or information systems	A	B	C
63. Strategic information on war plans, nuclear capabilities, or strategic weapons systems	A	B	C
64. Statements, tapes, or broadcasts for propaganda use	A	B	C
65. To change PW's attitude toward the war	A	B	C
66. To change PW's attitude toward U.S. (Government or socio-economic system)	A	B	C

	<u>No Interest</u>	<u>Minor Interest</u>	<u>Major Interest</u>
67. To politically or ideologically convert PWs	A	B	C
68. To obtain confessions of guilt for "war crimes"	A	B	C
69. To obtain admissions to breaking camp rules (or causing others to do so)	A	B	C
70. To obtain biographical information	A	B	C
71. To collect information on PW camp organization or communications (counterintelligence)	A	B	C
72. To obtain statements for use against other PWs	A	B	C
73. To determine PW's resistance posture	A	B	C
74. To fill administrative "squares" of prison authorities	A	B	C
75. To experiment with counter-resistance techniques or to develop a habit of complying with demands	A	B	C
76. Other (specify) _____	A	B	C

Please indicate your evaluation of the importance of revealing the following information or complying with the following captor demands:

	<u>Of No Importance Not To</u>	<u>Little Importance Not To</u>	<u>Of Some Importance Not To</u>	<u>Important Not To</u>	<u>Very Important Not To</u>
77. "Dash-1"/NATOPS unclassified (aircrew members only)	A	B	C	D	E
78. "Dash-1"/NATOPS unclassified (aircrew members only)	A	B	C	D	E
79. Kneeboard information (aircrew members only)	A	B	C	D	E
80. Aerial tactics (aircrew members only)	A	B	C	D	E
81. Targets (aircrew members only)	A	B	C	D	E

	<u>Of No Importance Not To</u>	<u>Little Importance Not To</u>	<u>Of Some Importance Not To</u>	<u>Important Not To</u>	<u>Very Important Not To</u>
82. Unit organization, personnel, equipment (Order of Battle)	A	B	C	D	E
83. Biographical information on another PW	A	B	C	D	E
84. Autobiographical information (self)	A	B	C	D	E
85. Writing propaganda	A	B	C	D	E
86. Written apologies	A	B	C	D	E
87. Propaganda broadcasts/tapes	A	B	C	D	E
88. General information about the United States	A	B	C	D	E
89. Taped letters home	A	B	C	D	E
90. Information on PW organization/leadership	A	B	C	D	E
91. In-camp PW communications techniques	A	B	C	D	E
92. Letters to U.S. Congress or President	A	B	C	D	E
93. Signing for packages/letters	A	B	C	D	E
94. Writing in copy books	A	B	C	D	E
95. Painting or drawing at captor's request	A	B	C	D	E
96. Participating in captor-sponsored religious or holiday events that are (or can be) photographed	A	B	C	D	E
97. Participating in tours (museums, bomb damage, etc.)	A	B	C	D	E
98. Meeting delegations or correspondents	A	B	C	D	E

	<u>Of No Importance Not To</u>	<u>Little Importance Not To</u>	<u>Of Some Importance Not To</u>	<u>Import- tant Not To</u>	<u>Very Import- tant Not To</u>
	A	B	C	D	E
99. Writing what you think is the truth about your circumstance or how you got there					

What did you do as a result of your initial period of interrogation/exploitation (before start of regular prison routine)?

	<u>No</u>	<u>Not Sure</u>	<u>Yes</u>
100. Gave what you believed to be important military information under "significant pain?"	A	B	C
101. Wrote propaganda statements or made tapes/broadcasts when subjected to significant pain?	A	B	C
102. Wrote apologies to escape further punishment?	A	B	C
103. Wrote propaganda statements or made tapes/broadcasts under <u>threat</u> of severe punishment?	A	B	C
104. Wrote propaganda statements or made tapes/broadcasts under threat of severe punishment <u>after</u> having been previously punished?	A	B	C
105. Gave what you believed to be important military information under <u>threat</u> of severe punishment?	A	B	C
106. Successfully countered exploitation efforts by furnishing unimportant information?	A	B	C

Please rate the following ways for protecting vital information (up to the point of exposure to "significant pain"):

	<u>Very Ineffec- tive</u>	<u>Fairly Ineffec- tive</u>	<u>Neither Effec- tive Nor Ineffec- tive</u>	<u>Fairly Effec- tive</u>	<u>Very Effec- tive</u>
	A	B	C	D	E
107. Giving some important information to protect other more important information					
108. Giving "harmless, routine" information freely before pressure is applied	A	B	C	D	E
109. Give false information which is in accord with facts known to the enemy	A	B	C	D	E

Protecting Vital Information
(Continued)

	<u>Very Ineffec- tive</u>	<u>Fairly Ineffec- tive</u>	<u>Neither Effec- tive Nor Ineffec- tive</u>	<u>Fairly Effec- tive</u>	<u>Very Effec- tive</u>
110. Overload the interrogator with a mass of unimportant information	A	B	C	D	E
111. Pretend difficulty remembering and recall information very slowly under pressure	A	B	C	D	E
112. Pretend cooperation with the captor for the purpose of gaining his confidence, with the intention of misleading him	A	B	C	D	E
113. Avoid extreme stress by bargaining with information given grudgingly	A	B	C	D	E
114. Stick to Name, Rank, Serial Number and Date of Birth	A	B	C	D	E
115. Provide personal biographical information	A	B	C	D	E
116. Give non-military and military information available in the press, magazines and radio	A	B	C	D	E
117. Give non-military information about conditions in the United States	A	B	C	D	E
118. Use actual injury to justify inability to comply	A	B	C	D	E
119. Use pretended injury to justify inability to comply	A	B	C	D	E
120. Make it appear that belligerence or lack of cooperation will make further efforts to exploit too difficult and not worth the effort	A	B	C	D	E
121. Other (please specify): _____ _____	A	B	C	D	E

Section C

This section should be completed only by those captured before 1 November 1969. You should also complete Section D which covers the period after November 1969.

1. Using a new answer sheet, mark response "C" opposite item 1.

What methods were used on you by the captor for interrogation/exploitation after the beginning of regular prison routine until the Fall of 1969? NOTE: Omit if captured after Fall 1969.

	<u>Never</u>	<u>Rarely</u>	<u>Occasionally</u>	<u>Often</u>	<u>Constantly</u>
2. Threat	A	B	C	D	E
3. Fear	A	B	C	D	E
4. Direct questions for information	A	B	C	D	E
5. Humiliation/degradation	A	B	C	D	E
6. Making PW uncertain of his fate	A	B	C	D	E
7. Deception or trickery	A	B	C	D	E
8. Emotional appeal	A	B	C	D	E
9. Confronting PW with information about him or his fellow PWs	A	B	C	D	E
10. Application of "significant pain" in physical mistreatment	A	B	C	D	E
11. Physical mistreatment <u>without</u> "significant pain"	A	B	C	D	E
12. Withholding medical attention	A	B	C	D	E
13. Withholding food or water	A	B	C	D	E
14. Friendliness or sympathy	A	B	C	D	E
15. Accusation of "crime"	A	B	C	D	E
16. Alternately threatening and friendly	A	B	C	D	E

	<u>Never</u>	<u>Rarely</u>	<u>Occasionally</u>	<u>Often</u>	<u>Constantly</u>
17. Promises of leniency or amnesty	A	B	C	D	E
18. Attempted or actual blackmail	A	B	C	D	E
19. Offers of food or drink	A	B	C	D	E
20. Offers of women	A	B	C	D	E
21. Offers of early release	A	B	C	D	E
22. Offers of special privileges	A	B	C	D	E
23. Used non-interrogator (i.e., journalist, doctor, or clergyman) to seek information	A	B	C	D	E
24. Playing upon PW's shock or despair at being captured	A	B	C	D	E

Now, please describe the effectiveness of those methods used by the captor for interrogation/exploitation after the start of prison routine until Fall 1969 (in causing you to comply with the captor's demands).

	<u>Not Ap- plicable (Not Used)</u>	<u>Very In- effec- tive</u>	<u>Some- what In- effec- tive</u>	<u>Neither Ineffec- tive nor Effective</u>	<u>Some- what Effec- tive</u>	<u>Very Effec- tive</u>
25. Threat	A	B	C	D	E	F
26. Fear	A	B	C	D	E	F
27. Direct questions for information	A	B	C	D	E	F
28. Humiliation/degradation	A	B	C	D	E	F
29. Making PW uncertain of his fate	A	B	C	D	E	F
30. Deception or trickery	A	B	C	D	E	F
31. Emotional appeal	A	B	C	D	E	F
32. Confronting PW with information about him or his fellow PWs.	A	B	C	D	E	F

	<u>Not Ap- plicable (Not Used)</u>	<u>Very In- effec- tive</u>	<u>Some- what In- effec- tive</u>	<u>Neither Ineffec- tive nor Effective</u>	<u>Some- what Effec- tive</u>	<u>Very Effec- tive</u>
33. Application of "significant pain" in physical mis- treatment	A	B	C	D	E	F
34. Physical mistreat- ment without "significant pain"	A	B	C	D	E	F
35. Withholding medical attention	A	B	C	D	E	F
36. Withholding food or water	A	B	C	D	E	F
37. Friendliness or sympathy	A	B	C	D	E	F
38. Accusation of "crime"	A	B	C	D	E	F
39. Alternately threat- ening and friendly	A	B	C	D	E	F
40. Promises of leniency or amnesty	A	B	C	D	E	F
41. Attempted or actual blackmail	A	B	C	D	E	F
42. Offers of food or drink	A	B	C	D	E	F
43. Offers of women	A	B	C	D	E	F
44. Offers of early release	A	B	C	D	E	F
45. Offers of special privileges	A	B	C	D	E	F
46. Used non-interrogator (i.e., journalist, doctor, or clergyman) to seek information	A	B	C	D	E	F
47. Playing upon PW's shock or despair at being captured	A	B	C	D	E	F

Based upon your personal experience, what were the captor's interests after the beginning of regular prison routine until the Fall of 1969? NOTE: Omit if captured after Fall 1969.

	<u>No Interest</u>	<u>Minor Interest</u>	<u>Main Interest</u>
48. Information on identification of aircraft or equipment, unit, other military personnel	A	B	C
49. Information on targets or tactical objective, battle tactics	A	B	C
50. Technical information on weapons systems or information systems	A	B	C
51. Strategic information on war plans, nuclear capabilities, or strategic weapons systems	A	B	C
52. Statements, tapes, or broadcasts for propaganda use	A	B	C
53. To change PW's attitude toward the war	A	B	C
54. To change PW's attitude toward U.S. (Government or socio-economic system)	A	B	C
55. To politically or ideologically convert PWs	A	B	C
56. To obtain confessions of guilt for "war crimes"	A	B	C
57. To obtain admissions to breaking camp rules (or causing others to do so	A	B	C
58. To obtain biographical information	A	B	C
59. To collect information on PW camp organization or communications (counterintelligence)	A	B	C
60. To obtain statements for use against other PWs	A	B	C
61. To determine PW's resistance posture	A	B	C
62. To fill administrative "squares" of prison authorities	A	B	C

	<u>No Interest</u>	<u>Minor Interest</u>	<u>Major Interest</u>
63. To experiment with counter-resistance techniques or to develop a habit of complying with demands	A	B	C
64. Other (specify) _____	A	B	C

What did you do under captor demands after the start of regular prison routine until the Fall of 1969? NOTE: Omit if captured after Fall of 1969.

	<u>No</u>	<u>Not Sure</u>	<u>Yes</u>
65. Gave what you believed to be important military information under "significant pain"	A	B	C
66. Wrote propaganda statements or made tapes/broadcasts when subjected to significant pain	A	B	C
67. Wrote apologies to escape further punishment	A	B	C
68. Wrote propaganda statements or made tapes/broadcasts under <u>threat</u> of severe punishment	A	B	C
69. Wrote propaganda statements or made tapes/broadcasts under threat of severe punishment <u>after</u> having been previously punished	A	B	C
70. Successfully countered exploitation efforts by furnishing unimportant information	A	B	C
71. Made concessions to captors under <u>threat</u> of being forced to give information on PW organization or communications (threat of communication purge)	A	B	C

Section D

To be completed by everyone.

1. Using a new answer sheet, mark response "D" opposite item 1.

What methods were used on you by the captor for interrogation/exploitation after the beginning of regular prison routine after the Fall of 1969?

	<u>Never</u>	<u>Rarely</u>	<u>Occasionally</u>	<u>Often</u>	<u>Constantly</u>
2. Threat	A	B	C	D	E
3. Fear	A	B	C	D	E
4. Direct questions for information	A	B	C	D	E
5. Humiliation/degradation	A	B	C	D	E
6. Making PW uncertain of his fate	A	B	C	D	E
7. Deception or trickery	A	B	C	D	E
8. Emotional appeal	A	B	C	D	E
9. Confronting PW with information about him or his fellow PWs	A	B	C	D	E
10. Application of "significant pain" in physical mistreatment	A	B	C	D	E
11. Physical mistreatment <u>without</u> "significant pain"	A	B	C	D	E
12. Withholding medical attention	A	B	C	D	E
13. Withholding food or water	A	B	C	D	E
14. Friendliness or sympathy	A	B	C	D	E
15. Accusation of "crime"	A	B	C	D	E
16. Alternately threatening and friendly	A	B	C	D	E
17. Promises of leniency or amnesty	A	B	C	D	E

	<u>Never</u>	<u>Rarely</u>	<u>Occasionally</u>	<u>Often</u>	<u>Constantly</u>
18. Attempted or actual blackmail	A	B	C	D	E
19. Offers of food or drink	A	B	C	D	E
20. Offers of women	A	B	C	D	E
21. Offers of early release	A	B	C	D	E
22. Offers of special privileges	A	B	C	D	E
23. Used non-interrogator (i.e., journalist, doctor, or clergyman) to seek information	A	B	C	D	E
24. Playing upon PW's shock or despair at being captured	A	B	C	D	E

Now, please describe the effectiveness of those methods used on you by the captor for interrogation/exploitation after Fall 1969 (in causing you to comply with the captor's demands).

	<u>Not Ap- plicable (Not Used)</u>	<u>Very In- effec- tive</u>	<u>Some- what In- effec- tive</u>	<u>Neither Ineffec- tive nor Effective</u>	<u>Some- what Effec- tive</u>	<u>Very Effec- tive</u>
25. Threat	A	B	C	D	E	F
26. Fear	A	B	C	D	E	F
27. Direct questions for information	A	B	C	D	E	F
28. Humiliation/ degradation	A	B	C	D	E	F
29. Making PW uncertain of his fate	A	B	C	D	E	F
30. Deception or trickery	A	B	C	D	E	F
31. Emotional appeal	A	B	C	D	E	F
32. Confronting PW with information about him or his fellow PWs	A	B	C	D	E	F

	<u>Not Ap- plicable (Not Used)</u>	<u>Very In- effec- tive</u>	<u>Some- what In- effec- tive</u>	<u>Neither Ineffec- tive nor Effective</u>	<u>Some- what Effec- tive</u>	<u>Very Effec- tive</u>
33. Application of "significant pain" in physical mis- treatment	A	B	C	D	E	F
34. Physical mistreat- ment without "significant pain"	A	B	C	D	E	F
35. Withholding medical attention	A	B	C	D	E	F
36. Withholding food or water	A	B	C	D	E	F
37. Friendliness or sympathy	A	B	C	D	E	F
38. Accusation of "crime"	A	B	C	D	E	F
39. Alternately threat- ening and friendly	A	B	C	D	E	F
40. Promises of leniency or amnesty	A	B	C	D	E	F
41. Attempted or actual blackmail	A	B	C	D	E	F
42. Offers of food or drink	A	B	C	D	E	F
43. Offers of women	A	B	C	D	E	F
44. Offers of early release	A	B	C	D	E	F
45. Offers of special privileges	A	B	C	D	E	F
46. Used non-interrogator (i.e., journalist, doctor, or clergyman) to seek information	A	B	C	D	E	F
47. Playing upon PW's shock or despair at being captured	A	B	C	D	E	F

Based upon your personal experience, what were the captor's interests after the beginning of regular prison routine after the Fall of 1969?

	<u>No Interest</u>	<u>Minor Interest</u>	<u>Major Interest</u>
48. Information on identification of aircraft or equipment, unit, other military personnel	A	B	C
49. Information on targets or tactical objective, battle tactics	A	B	C
50. Technical information on weapons systems or information systems	A	B	C
51. Strategic information on war plans, nuclear capabilities, or strategic weapons systems	A	B	C
52. Statements, tapes, or broadcasts for propaganda use	A	B	C
53. To change PW's attitude toward the war	A	B	C
54. To change PW's attitude toward U.S. (Government or socio-economic system)	A	B	C
55. To politically or ideologically convert PWs	A	B	C
56. To obtain confessions of guilt for "war crimes"	A	B	C
57. To obtain admissions to breaking camp rules (or causing others to do so)	A	B	C
58. To obtain biographical information	A	B	C
59. To collect information on PW camp organization or communications (Counterintelligence)	A	B	C
60. To obtain statements for use against other PWs	A	B	C
61. To determine PW's resistance posture	A	B	C
62. To fill administrative "squares" of prison authorities	A	B	C
63. To experiment with counter-resistance techniques or to develop a habit of complying with demands	A	B	C

	<u>No Interest</u>	<u>Minor Interest</u>	<u>Major Interest</u>
	A	B	C
64. Other (specify) _____			

What did you do under captor demands after the start of regular prison routine after the Fall of 1969?

	<u>No</u>	<u>Not Sure</u>	<u>Yes</u>
65. Gave what you believed to be important military information under "significant pain"	A	B	C
66. Wrote propaganda statements or made tapes/broadcasts when subjected to significant pain	A	B	C
67. Wrote apologies to escape further punishment	A	B	C
68. Wrote propaganda statements or made tapes/broadcasts under <u>threat</u> of severe punishment	A	B	C
69. Wrote propaganda statements or made tapes/broadcasts under threat of severe punishment <u>after</u> having been previously punished	A	B	C
70. Successfully countered exploitation efforts by furnishing unimportant information	A	B	C

Please react to the following statements concerning the willing or unwilling participation of a PW in filmed events or the making of broadcast tapes.

	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>	<u>Disagree</u>	<u>Neither Agree Nor Disagree</u>	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Strongly Agree</u>
71. Such participation is always harmful to the morale of other PWs	A	B	C	D	E
72. It is justified when the captor can be made to appear foolish	A	B	C	D	E
73. That is one way for the PW to communicate outside or inside the PW camp	A	B	C	D	E
74. It usually is more useful to the captor than to the PW	A	B	C	D	E
75. PWs didn't always understand the importance of that participation	A	B	C	D	E
76. Did it to reduce captor pressures for further compliance	A	B	C	D	E

Rate the following factors in setting your own standards of resistance to interrogation/exploitation.

	<u>Very Unimportant</u>	<u>Somewhat Unimportant</u>	<u>Neither Unimportant Nor Important</u>	<u>Somewhat Important</u>	<u>Very Important</u>
77. Your own beliefs and values	A	B	C	D	E
78. The Code of Conduct (as you interpret it)	A	B	C	D	E
79. Pride or integrity	A	B	C	D	E
80. The degree of physical force applied by the captor	A	B	C	D	E

From your experiences, how difficult do you believe it is to avoid complying with captor demands under the following circumstances?

	<u>Very Easy</u>	<u>Easy</u>	<u>Fairly Easy</u>	<u>Neither Easy Nor Difficult</u>	<u>Fairly Difficult</u>	<u>Difficult</u>	<u>Very Difficult</u>
81. Making a PW witness or hear the mistreatment of fellow prisoners	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
82. Getting PW to believe he can only remain alive by giving in	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
83. Threats of execution	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
84. Enforced lack of sleep	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
85. Showing evidence that fellow prisoners have cooperated with the captor	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
86. Actual physical mistreatment involving significant pain	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
87. Long solitary confinement	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
88. Withholding badly needed medical attention	A	B	C	D	E	F	G

	<u>Very Easy</u>	<u>Easy</u>	<u>Fairly Easy</u>	<u>Neither Easy Nor Difficult</u>	<u>Fairly Diffi- cult</u>	<u>Diffi- cult</u>	<u>Very Diffi- cult</u>
89. Withholding badly needed dental care	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
90. Threats of non-repatriation	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
91. Starvation diet	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
92. Implied threats to family members back home	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
93. Promise of better treatment	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
94. Threats to treat PW as a spy or war criminal	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
95. Withholding of letters and package, from home	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
96. Confrontation with personal information gathered from the U.S. or other PWs	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
97. Confrontation with evidence that some U.S. political leaders are unsympathetic to the war	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
98. Making Christmas tapes to get your name out	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
99. Meeting a peace delegation to get your name out	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
100. Make, or participate in the making of, broadcasts, tapes or films to get your name out	A	B	C	D	E	F	G

Section E

To be completed by everyone.

INSTRUCTIONS:

BEFORE answering any of the next 36 questions, read them and the discussion which follows question 36. A copy of the Code of Conduct is included at the end of this Section for your reference.

1. Using a new answer sheet, mark response "E" opposite item 1.

Describe the most frequent causes for infractions of PW discipline:

	<u>Never</u>	<u>Rarely</u>	<u>Occasionally</u>	<u>Often</u>	<u>Always</u>
2. No real authority was (or could be) directly applied	A	B	C	D	E
3. Individual PW ego or stubbornness	A	B	C	D	E
4. Fear of captors	A	B	C	D	E
5. Disagreement with policies of PW organization	A	B	C	D	E
6. Frustration with individual PW leaders	A	B	C	D	E

In cases where an apparently lawful order of a senior ranking officer (SRO) was disobeyed or seriously questioned, rank the following possible reasons for such (use 1 for the most probable, 4 for the least probable).

- A. 1
- B. 2
- C. 3
- D. 4

Look at each statement and rank them on your questionnaire. Then enter the appropriate code for the rank opposite the indicated item number on your answer sheet. For example, if you considered the first as ranking third, you would enter "C" opposite item 7 on your answer sheet.

7. () There was doubt that court-martial action would be taken.
8. () There was doubt that even if court-martial action were taken, a conviction could be obtained.
9. () Even the consequences of conviction were preferable to enduring conditions then prevailing.
10. () The lawful constitution of authority in a PW camp was open for debate.

Please react to the following statements.

	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>	<u>Disagree</u>	<u>Neither Agree Nor Disagree</u>	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Strongly Agree</u>
11. An SRO needs more authority to maintain discipline in a PW camp	A	B	C	D	E
12. The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) provides sufficient legal authority for an SRO to maintain discipline	A	B	C	D	E
13. A PW camp is a special problem of command and requires a different set of rules	A	B	C	D	E

With respect to the Code of Conduct, indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following statements based upon your interpretation and personal experience:

	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>	<u>Disagree</u>	<u>Neither Agree Nor Disagree</u>	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Strongly Agree</u>
14. The Code was <u>principally</u> written to satisfy a need for a policy toward PW behavior in captivity	A	B	C	D	E
15. The Code principally served <u>only</u> as a useful statement of <u>personal</u> ethical/moral values	A	B	C	D	E
16. The Code represents what our society expects for PW behavior in captivity.	A	B	C	D	E
17. The Code is principally a code of <u>professional</u> ethics	A	B	C	D	E
18. The Code <u>is</u> legally binding	A	B	C	D	E
19. The Code is unnecessary	A	B	C	D	E
20. The Code should be changed to permit giving more than name, rank, service number, and date of birth	A	B	C	D	E
21. The Code should be changed to remove the obligation to attempt escape	A	B	C	D	E

	<u>strongly</u> <u>Disagree</u>	<u>Disagree</u>	<u>Neither Agree</u> <u>Nor Disagree</u>	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Strongly</u> <u>Agree</u>
22. The Code should be changed to specify who should be the SRO or NCOIC	A	B	C	D	E
23. The Code should be legally binding by reference to it in the UCMJ	A	B	C	D	E
24. The Code should be uniformly interpreted for all Services	A	B	C	D	E
25. The Code should be clarified with regard to questions concerning parole, special favor, early release, or offers of amnesty	A	B	C	D	E
26. The Code was a useful resistance tool during the entire period of captivity	A	B	C	D	E
27. The Code was especially useful for resistance during the very early (initial) stages of captivity	A	B	C	D	E
28. There are changes needed in the Code which are not covered in this section	A	B	C	D	E

COMMENT: If you have additional comment on any issue raised by the above statements, use the following space. Add other sheets if desired. You may propose specific changes to the Code here.

Please consider the following possible situation:

After having forced compliance to give information or make statements, the captor increases demands upon PWs to the point wherein the senior ranking officer of the PW organization commands the stiffening of resistance to the captor's demands.

The captor in turn responds to evidence of increased resistance by increasing punishment of PWs and attempts to ruin the PW organization.

In this situation, the confrontation between PWs and the captor could be cause for the captor's steadily increasing punishment of PWs, isolation of SROs, etc.

What should an SRO do?

	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>	<u>Disagree</u>	<u>Neither Agree Nor Disagree</u>	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Strongly Agree</u>
29. Order PWs to stick to the <u>present</u> Code, but develop reasons for refusing captor demands	A	B	C	D	E
30. Permit each PW to establish his own resistance posture under the <u>present</u> Code	A	B	C	D	E
31. Selectively permit departures from the <u>present</u> Code in cases where he feels that such departures are not harmful to the country or other PWs	A	B	C	D	E
32. Adopt a variety of resistance postures which are in line with the <u>present</u> Code in order to obscure any unified resistance from the captor	A	B	C	D	E
33. Order PWs to stick to the Code <u>as you would prefer to see it changed</u> , but develop reasons for refusing captor demands	A	B	C	D	E
34. Permit each PW to establish his own resistance posture under the Code <u>as you would prefer to see it changed</u>	A	B	C	D	E
35. Selectively permit departures from the Code, <u>as you would prefer to see it changed</u> , in cases where he feels that such departures are not harmful to the country or other PWs	A	B	C	D	E

Strongly <u>Disagree</u>	<u>Disagree</u>	Neither Agree <u>Nor Disagree</u>	<u>Agree</u>	Strongly <u>Agree</u>
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36. Adopt a variety of resistance postures which are in line with the Code, as you would prefer to see it changed, in order to obscure any unified resistance from the captor

A	B	C	D	E
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NOTE:

Please weigh carefully the following before you answer the above questions: How important is it to preserve the PW organization? Will the individual and group resistance be better with or without it? Can you achieve variety in resistance postures and still stick to the Code?

Once a PW yields, is he more vulnerable to further exploitation? Is it better to make some concessions as a group than risk the weaker ones being singled out for further exploitation?

Since the senior officer may be subjected to greatest pressure, is it wise to allow him to set the standards under pressure?

Is it feasible to try to write a Code for all situations?

Is it feasible to set a high standard but specify certain lower limits beyond which one would not go? Would the captor not quickly learn those limits, and would he be satisfied (consider military secrets)? Is one likely to quit trying if he feels the standards are unrealistic? Are the norms of the group likely to lower when they commiserate?

Will a man surprise himself as to what he can endure if: (a) He has no choice, (b) Feels he has no good alternative?

Can we expect an effective fighting force in combat or an effective resistance force in captivity if the standards of performance are set by the men under fire/pressure?

Assume we abolish or radically change the parts of the Code pertaining to conduct in captivity, would the result be acceptable to our society, would we be able to guard military secrets?

How important is pride and self-respect in enabling one: (a) To resist, (b) To return to a productive, happy life when he gets back?

NOW ANSWER THE PRECEDING 36 QUESTIONS.

There are eight basic activities covered by the Code. Please indicate your evaluation of the Code with respect to these factors.

	<u>Very Useless</u>	<u>Useless</u>	<u>Neither Useful Nor Useless</u>	<u>Useful</u>	<u>Highly Useful</u>
37. Code instructions for <u>resistance</u>	A	B	C	D	E
38. Code instructions for <u>escape</u>	A	B	C	D	E
39. Code instructions for <u>parole</u>	A	B	C	D	E
40. Code instructions on accepting special favors	A	B	C	D	E
41. Code requirements for organization (i.e., SROs)	A	B	C	D	E
42. Code instructions for <u>divulging information</u>	A	B	C	D	E
43. Code policy toward <u>collaboration</u>	A	B	C	D	E
44. Code position on PW <u>responsibility for personal actions</u>	A	B	C	D	E

At the time of your capture, how familiar were you with the provisions of the Code of Conduct? With the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)?

	<u>Totally Unfamiliar</u>	<u>Very Unfamiliar</u>	<u>Not Familiar</u>	<u>Somewhat Familiar</u>	<u>Familiar</u>	<u>Very Familiar</u>
45. Code	A	B	C	D	E	F
46. UCMJ	A	B	C	D	E	F

Based upon your experience during captivity, when efforts to instruct PWs or clarify the Code were conducted, evaluate the following statements:

	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>	<u>Dis- agree</u>	<u>Neither Agree Nor Disagree</u>	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Strongly Agree</u>	<u>Not Applicable</u>
47. Efforts to clarify the Code and make it uniform were effective	A	B	C	D	E	F
48. Prevailing interpretation of the Code depended upon mutual agreement among majority of PWs	A	B	C	D	E	F

	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>	<u>Dis-agree</u>	<u>Neither Agree Nor Disagree</u>	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Strongly Agree</u>	<u>Not Applicable</u>
49. Code interpretation depended upon instructions of SROs	A	B	C	D	E	F
50. Instruction on the Code was frequently given to PWs and provided to all new PWs	A	B	C	D	E	F
51. Instruction on the Plums was frequently given to PWs and provided to all new PWs	A	B	C	D	E	F

The following questions relate to PW organization. Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following statements.

	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>	<u>Dis-agree</u>	<u>Neither Agree Nor Disagree</u>	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Strongly Agree</u>	<u>Not Applicable</u>
52. If junior, sought out SRO	A	B	C	D	E	F
53. If senior, sought to take charge	A	B	C	D	E	F
54. I was fully aware of leadership and command structure	A	B	C	D	E	F
55. There should be an SRO in a 2 to 4-man room	A	B	C	D	E	F
56. Prior to "Unity," I was aware of the command structure	A	B	C	D	E	F
57. Leadership developed swiftly and surely	A	B	C	D	E	F
58. The Fourth Allied POW Wing was effective	A	B	C	D	E	F
59. The Fourth Allied POW Wing was well organized	A	B	C	D	E	F
60. Service of SRO made no difference	A	B	C	D	E	F

	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>	<u>Dis-agree</u>	<u>Neither Agree Nor Disagree</u>	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Strongly Agree</u>	<u>Not Applicable</u>
61. Captor attempts to suppress organization were effective	A	B	C	D	E	F
62. The Ops orders were adequate and clear	A	B	C	D	E	F
63. Specific Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) guidance for captivity circumstances was needed	A	B	C	D	E	F
64. Leadership and command can be maintained in a non-command camp	A	B	C	D	E	F
65. Leadership guidance always applied to individual circumstances	A	B	C	D	E	F
66. I always obtained effective guidance	A	B	C	D	E	F
67. I always sought guidance	A	B	C	D	E	F
68. Previous training formed the basis for PW organization	A	B	C	D	E	F
69. Discipline was strict in the PW camp	A	B	C	D	E	F
70. All personal freedoms such as eating, drinking, sleeping, reading, writing, etc., must be inviolate from PW camp or SRO authority	A	B	C	D	E	F
71. The junior "room responsible" system did not disrupt PW organization	A	B	C	D	E	F
72. PWs were accountable to their compatriots for all their actions	A	B	C	D	E	F

Consider the following statements and rate their significance.

	<u>Definitely True</u>	<u>Probably True</u>	<u>Possibly True</u>	<u>Possibly Not True</u>	<u>Probably Not True</u>	<u>Definitely Not True</u>
73. Captor views of the war, history, etc., were demoralizing	A	B	C	D	E	F
74. Captor indoctrination had no effect	A	B	C	D	E	F
75. Anti-war propaganda taken from U.S. sources was demoralizing	A	B	C	D	E	F
76. Promises of amnesty by the captor were attractive to PWs	A	B	C	D	E	F
77. Visits outside the prison to museums or to view bomb damage were conducive to changing PW attitude toward the war	A	B	C	D	E	F
78. PWs never felt like "war criminals"	A	B	C	D	E	F
79. The war was consistent with PWs' personal beliefs and commitments	A	B	C	D	E	F
80. Camp radio broadcasts and statements by fellow PWs were not demoralizing	A	B	C	D	E	F
81. "180 degree decoding" of captor propaganda always worked	A	B	C	D	E	F

During the initial stage of captivity, which of the following aspects was most often in your thoughts? Rank in order of frequency, the most frequent being 1, the least being 6. Enter your answers on your answer sheet in the same manner as you did for questions 7-10 earlier in this section.

- A. 1
- B. 2
- C. 3
- D. 4
- E. 5
- F. 6

- 82. () "Quizzes" (interrogations/interviews)
- 83. () Home/family
- 84. () Health
- 85. () Career
- 86. () Being forgotten
- 87. () Other (specify)

During the period after Fall 1969 or during the communal period of captivity, which of the following aspects was most often in your thoughts? Rank in order of frequency, the most frequent being 1, the least being 6.

- A. 1
- B. 2
- C. 3
- D. 4
- E. 5
- F. 6

- 88. () "Quizzes" (interrogations/interviews)
- 89. () Home/family
- 90. () Health
- 91. () Career
- 92. () Being forgotten
- 93. () Other (specify)

Please indicate your feelings toward the following statements:

	<u>Definitely True</u>	<u>Probably True</u>	<u>Possibly True</u>	<u>Possibly Not True</u>	<u>Probably Not True</u>	<u>Definitely Not True</u>
94. Effective organization can be maintained in a non-communal camp with tap, signal, and note communication only	A	B	C	D	E	F
95. Due to the cryptic nature of communications, some messages were garbled or misconstrued	A	B	C	D	E	F
96. Discipline can be maintained with non-verbal communications only	A	B	C	D	E	F

Please react to the following statements concerning in-camp communications (comm).

	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>	<u>Dis- agree</u>	<u>Neither Agree Nor Disagree</u>	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Strongly Agree</u>
97. Comms were secure from intercept or compromise	A	B	C	D	E
98. Comms were hard to learn and use	A	B	C	D	E
99. Different channels were needed to be certain that messages got through	A	B	C	D	E
100. Messages were often misunderstood when transmitted by tap code	A	B	C	D	E
101. There was too much comm in Camp Unity	A	B	C	D	E
102. Which of the following should govern the decision to escape?					
A. SRO only					
B. SRO with advice of escape committee					
C. Escape committee only					
D. Escapees only					
E. Service should not exhort continued requirement to escape					
F. Other (specify):					

In view of your personal experience, indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following statements:

	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>	<u>Disagree</u>	<u>Neither Agree Nor Disagree</u>	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Strongly Agree</u>
103. Escape to freedom was possible without outside assistance	A	B	C	D	E
104. Escape to freedom was possible <u>only</u> with outside aid	A	B	C	D	E
105. SROs were in favor of attempting escape	A	B	C	D	E
106. PWs generally were <u>not</u> in favor of attempting escape	A	B	C	D	E
107. The Code of Conduct should be interpreted to mean that escape should be attempted only when chances of escape are adequate and other PWs are not jeopardized	A	B	C	D	E
108. Escape techniques should be emphasized over evasion techniques in E&E training	A	B	C	D	E
109. Enough emphasis was given to escape training in Survival School	A	B	C	D	E

Please rate the following:

	<u>Very Unimportant</u>	<u>Somewhat Unimportant</u>	<u>Neither Unimportant Nor Important</u>	<u>Somewhat Important</u>	<u>Very Important</u>
110. Reprisals against escape	A	B	C	D	E
111. Low odds for success	A	B	C	D	E
112. Reprisals against fellow PWs who didn't attempt escape	A	B	C	D	E
113. General negative attitudes of PWs toward escape due to risks involved	A	B	C	D	E

	<u>Very Unimportant</u>	<u>Somewhat Unimportant</u>	<u>Neither Unimportant Nor Important</u>	<u>Somewhat Important</u>	<u>Very Important</u>
114. Attitudes of SROs toward escape	A	B	C	D	E
115. Other (specify): _____	A	B	C	D	E

Answer this question only if you feel you were prone to have confrontation with the captors in excess of what a large number (or perhaps the majority) of PWs seemed prudent. My reason(s) was/were because:

	<u>Not at all</u>	<u>Partly</u>	<u>Largely</u>	<u>Mostly</u>
116. I had feelings of guilt when I learned others had resisted more than I	A	B	C	D
117. I felt the group was getting soft (i.e., valued good treatment above self-esteem) and I wanted to make a point	A	B	C	D
118. I felt the Code of Conduct called for resistance of almost everything the captor wanted (e.g., standing at attention for head count)	A	B	C	D
119. My <u>personal</u> code called for resistance of almost everything the captor wanted (e.g., standing at attention for head count)	A	B	C	D
120. It was hard to control my hatred because they had forced me to do things against my will	A	B	C	D

Rate the following as sources of conflict among PWs.

	<u>Rarely a Source</u>	<u>Sometimes a Source</u>	<u>Often a Source</u>	<u>Usually a Source</u>	<u>Constantly a Source</u>
121. Disagreement over what we should resist and how	A	B	C	D	E
122. Unequal treatment of PWs by captors	A	B	C	D	E
123. Efforts to regulate eating, sleeping, exercising, etc.	A	B	C	D	E
124. Efforts to restrict contact with captor	A	B	C	D	E

	<u>Rarely a Source</u>	<u>Sometimes a Source</u>	<u>Often a Source</u>	<u>Usually a Source</u>	<u>Constantly a Source</u>
125. Efforts to restrict reading of propaganda or watching propaganda movies	A	B	C	D	E

126. Other (specify): _____	A	B	C	D	E
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Resolution of conflict in a PW environment is best achieved by a leader who

	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>	<u>Disagree</u>	<u>Neither Agree Nor Disagree</u>	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Strongly Agree</u>
127. Authoritarian (listens to pros and cons then makes a decision in a "military manner")	A	B	C	D	E
128. Democratic (relies on majority vote to decide the issue)	A	B	C	D	E
129. Laissez faire (lets each man decide for himself)	A	B	C	D	E
130. In relation to other PWs, in your camp(s) who were captured in your general time frame, do you think you resisted:					

- A. Less
- B. About the same
- C. More

CODE OF CONDUCT

Article I

I am an American fighting man. I serve in the forces which guard my country and our way of life. I am prepared to give my life in their defense.

Article II

I will never surrender of my own free will. If in command I will never surrender my men while they still have the means to resist.

Article III

If I am captured I will continue to resist by all means available. I will make every effort to escape and aid others to escape. I will accept neither parole nor special favors from the enemy.

Article IV

If I become a prisoner of war, I will keep faith with my fellow prisoners. I will give no information nor take part in any action which might be harmful to my comrades. If I am senior, I will take command. If not, I will obey the lawful orders of those appointed over me and will back them up in every way.

Article V

When questioned, should I become a prisoner of war, I am bound to give only name, rank, service number, and date of birth. I will evade answering further questions to the utmost of my ability. I will make no oral or written statements disloyal to my country and its allies or harmful to their cause.

Article VI

I will never forget that I am an American fighting man, responsible for my actions, and dedicated to the principles which made my country free. I will trust in my God and in the United States of America.

Section F

Everyone should complete this section.

1. Using a new answer sheet, mark response "F" opposite item 1.
2. In which one of the following skills are you most proficient?
 - A. Medical/first aid
 - B. Outdoor survival or trek (other than survival schools)
 - C. Foreign language of captor
 - D. Physical fitness or sport
 - E. Mechanical or engineering skills
 - F. Teacher training
 - G. Psychology or psychological warfare
 - H. Dietetics or nutrition
 - I. Hygiene and/or sanitation
 - J. Debate or forensic or legal training
 - K. Counseling or interviewing
 - L. None of the above
3. Which one of the following individual hobbies was the most important before entering captivity?
 - A. Collecting (coins, stamps, etc.)
 - B. Woodworking/furniture building
 - C. Individual sports
 - D. Cars
 - E. Reading
 - F. Painting/drawing
 - G. Musical instrument
 - H. Writing
 - I. Inventing
 - J. Investing
 - K. Fishing/hunting/guns
 - L. Hiking/camping
 - M. Boating/sailing
 - N. Other (please specify): _____
4. Which one of the following group activities was the most important to you before entering captivity?
 - A. Team sports
 - B. Bridge or chess
 - C. Civic groups or clubs
 - D. Political activities
 - E. Church activities
 - F. Family activities
 - G. Other (please specify): _____
5. How much time per month did you (on the average) spend reading books, newspapers, magazines, or professional journals before captivity?
 - A. 50 hours or more
 - B. 35 thru 49 hours
 - C. 25 thru 34 hours
 - D. 15 thru 24 hours
 - E. 10 thru 14 hours
 - F. 5 thru 9 hours
 - G. 1 thru 4 hours
 - H. Less than 1 hour

6. What were your reading preferences prior to being captured? (Select one - the most important)
- A. Scholarly non-fiction. (For example: Politics, economics, biographies, sociology, history, etc.)
 - B. Popular non-fiction
 - C. Popular novels, short stories
 - D. Science fiction
 - E. Classics and poetry
 - F. Magazines, newspapers
 - G. Professional journals
7. If an officer, what was the source of your commission?
- A. United States Military Academy (USMA)
 - B. United States Naval Academy (USNA)
 - C. United States Air Force Academy (USAFA)
 - D. Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC)
 - E. Officer Candidate School (OCS)
 - F. Officer Training School (OTS)
 - G. Aviation Cadet Program (ACP)
 - H. Army Warrant Officer Program
 - I. Direct Appointment
 - J. Air National Guard (ANG)
 - K. United States Air Force Reserves, United States Navy Reserves or United States Army Reserves
 - L. Army National Guard (ARNG)
 - M. Other
 - N. Not an officer
8. What is your current military status?
- A. Regular active duty
 - B. Reserve on extended active duty (EAD)
 - C. Reserve not on EAD
 - D. Separated from military service
 - E. Not in military service
9. If you were an aircrew member when captured, please indicate your flying assignment at time of capture.
- | | |
|--------------------------|---------------------|
| A. Not an aircrew member | H. Gunner |
| B. Bomber pilot | I. Radar Officer |
| C. Fighter pilot | J. Crew Chief |
| D. Recon pilot | K. FAC |
| E. Navigator | L. Helicopter pilot |
| F. Bombardier | M. Helicopter crew |
| G. ECM | N. Other |
10. If an aircrew member, please indicate your primary mission at time of shoot-down (unclassified only).
- | | |
|----------------------------|------------------|
| A. Not an aircrew member | F. SAR |
| B. Tactical bombing | G. ABCCC |
| C. SAM or Flak Suppression | H. ECM |
| D. MIG CAP | I. Unarmed Recon |
| E. RESCAP | J. Other |

11. What was your ground assignment at time of capture (non-flyers)?

- | | |
|-----------------------|----------------------|
| A. Not Applicable | F. Airmobile |
| B. Infantry | G. Special Forces |
| C. Armor | H. Medic |
| D. Artillery or AAA | I. FAC |
| E. Non-combat Support | J. Perimeter Defense |
| | K. Other |

12. Where was your immediate family living at time of your capture?

- A. No family obligations
- B. Family was in government quarters in U.S. or abroad
- C. Family or dependents residing in U.S. with parents or relative
- D. Family residing in U.S. in private quarters (owned or rented)
- E. Family residing outside U.S. in private quarters

13. Had you executed a power of attorney at time of capture?

- A. Wife or dependent had general power of attorney
- B. Wife or dependent had limited power of attorney
- C. Wife or dependent had no power of attorney
- D. Power of attorney to relative or other entity (i.e., bank, attorney, etc.)
- E. Limited power of attorney for dependents
- F. No power of attorney

14. How many dependent children did you have?

- | | |
|----------|------------------|
| A. None | F. Five |
| B. One | G. Six |
| C. Two | H. Seven |
| D. Three | I. Eight or more |
| E. Four | |

15. Had you executed a will prior to being captured?

- A. Had not executed a will
- B. A valid will was in force
- C. Community property agreement in force

16. How long had you been married before being captured?

- A. Not married
- B. Less than one year
- C. One but less than two years
- D. Two but less than three years
- E. Three but less than four years
- F. Four but less than five years
- G. Five but less than ten years
- H. Ten but less than fifteen years
- I. Fifteen but less than twenty years
- J. Twenty years or more

17. What allotments did you have at the time of capture?

- A. Class E/D or Q to bank to joint account only
- B. Class E/D or Q to wife or dependents only
- C. No allotments to wife or dependents

18. Which area of the U.S. were you principally raised in during your school years?

- A. New England (Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont)
- B. Middle Atlantic (New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania)
- C. East North Central (Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin)
- D. West North Central (Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota)
- E. South Atlantic (Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia)
- F. Far South Central (Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee)
- G. West South Central (Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas)
- H. Mountain (Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, Wyoming)
- I. Pacific (California, Oregon, Washington)
- J. U.S. - non-CONUS (Alaska, Hawaii)
- K. Non-CONUS (in a foreign country)

19. Where did you live most of the time while you were growing up?

- A. Farm or ranch
- B. In the country, but not on a farm or ranch
- C. Town or small city (less than 25,000 people)
- D. City (25,000 - 100,000 people)
- E. Large city (100,000 or more people)
- F. In the suburb of a large city

20. What was your father's principal occupation during the time you were growing up?

- A. Professional
- B. Skilled labor
- C. Unskilled labor
- D. Trades
- E. Military
- F. Sales/clerical
- G. Technician
- H. Other (please specify): _____

Please rate the following personal qualities in terms of their importance for enduring or surviving captivity.

	<u>Very</u> <u>Unimportant</u>	<u>Neither</u> <u>Important Nor</u> <u>Unimportant</u>	<u>Somewhat</u> <u>Important</u>	<u>Important</u>	<u>Very</u> <u>Important</u>
21. Willingness to try alternatives	A	B	C	D	E
22. Practicality	A	B	C	D	E
23. Tolerance of others	A	B	C	D	E
24. Tolerance to being alone or isolated	A	B	C	D	E
25. Self-understanding	A	B	C	D	E

	<u>Very Unimportant</u>	<u>Neither Important Nor Unimportant</u>	<u>Somewhat Important</u>	<u>Important</u>	<u>Very Important</u>
26. Sensitive to others' feelings	A	B	C	D	E
27. Trust in fellow PWs	A	B	C	D	E
28. Patience	A	B	C	D	E
29. Humility	A	B	C	D	E
30. Pride	A	B	C	D	E
31. Self-control	A	B	C	D	E
32. Sense of humor	A	B	C	D	E
33. Faith in God or higher being	A	B	C	D	E
34. Faith in United States	A	B	C	D	E
35. Faith in family or friends	A	B	C	D	E
36. Hope for the future	A	B	C	D	E
37. Ability to suffer pain	A	B	C	D	E
38. Ability to suffer disappointment	A	B	C	D	E
39. "Can do" attitude	A	B	C	D	E
40. Ability to accept captivity situation	A	B	C	D	E

Please rate the following skills in surviving or enduring captivity.

	<u>Very Unimportant</u>	<u>Neither Important Nor Unimportant</u>	<u>Somewhat Important</u>	<u>Important</u>	<u>Very Important</u>
41. Ability to solve complex problems	A	B	C	D	E
42. Ability to argue or debate	A	B	C	D	E
43. Having many different skills or ideas	A	B	C	D	E
44. Writing or speaking skills	A	B	C	D	E
45. Foreign language skills	A	B	C	D	E
46. "Outdoor" skills	A	B	C	D	E
47. Skill with your hands	A	B	C	D	E

Rate the importance of the following education or training in survival or endurance.

	<u>Very Unimportant</u>	<u>Somewhat Unimportant</u>	<u>Somewhat Important</u>	<u>Important</u>	<u>Very Important</u>
48. Formal education	A	B	C	D	E
49. General military training	A	B	C	D	E
50. Survival training	A	B	C	D	E
51. Resistance and Code of Conduct training	A	B	C	D	E
52. Evasion and escape (E&E) training	A	B	C	D	E
53. Training in medicine or first aid	A	B	C	D	E
54. Training in hygiene or sanitation	A	B	C	D	E

	<u>Very Unimportant</u>	<u>Neither Important Nor Unimportant</u>	<u>Somewhat Important</u>	<u>Important</u>	<u>Very Important</u>
55. Training in locating or identifying food, water, or medicinal substances	A	B	C	D	E
56. Training in how to control one's own mind or thoughts	A	B	C	D	E
57. Training to avoid or withstand pain	A	B	C	D	E
58. Extra training to resist interrogation or exploitation	A	B	C	D	E

From your experience, how important are the following to survival or endurance of captivity.

	<u>Very Unimportant</u>	<u>Somewhat Unimportant</u>	<u>Somewhat Important</u>	<u>Important</u>	<u>Very Important</u>
59. Additional background and knowledge of U.S. war aims and political objectives	A	B	C	D	E
60. Additional background information on U.S. socio-economic system	A	B	C	D	E
61. Background on captor's political and socio-economic system	A	B	C	D	E
62. Formal religious or other ethical/moral training	A	B	C	D	E
63. Knowledge of behavior and attitudes of captors	A	B	C	D	E
64. Knowledge of prisons or prison systems	A	B	C	D	E
65. Knowledge of ways captors can exploit PWs	A	B	C	D	E

What sources of medical information and knowledge were available and useful during captivity?

	<u>Quite Useless</u>	<u>No Use</u>	<u>Slight Use</u>	<u>Useful</u>	<u>Very Useful</u>
66. Knowledge from past personal training or experience	A	B	C	D	E
67. Survival/SERE training	A	B	C	D	E
68. Information from other PWs	A	B	C	D	E
69. "Learning the hard way" as a PW	A	B	C	D	E

How much medical/first aid/health care training could you have used?

	<u>Less</u>	<u>No More</u>	<u>Some More</u>	<u>Quite a Bit more</u>	<u>Much More</u>
70. Diagnosis of disease or ailment	A	B	C	D	E
71. Diagnosis of injuries	A	B	C	D	E
72. Patient care	A	B	C	D	E
73. Use of common drugs	A	B	C	D	E
74. Identifying herbal or common substance medicines	A	B	C	D	E
75. Hygiene and sanitation	A	B	C	D	E
76. Calisthenics or isometrics	A	B	C	D	E
77. Diet and nutrition	A	B	C	D	E
78. Knowledge of psychosomatic illness	A	B	C	D	E
79. Knowledge of abnormal psychology	A	B	C	D	E
80. Identifying serious vs non-serious symptoms	A	B	C	D	E
81. Other (specify): _____	A	B	C	D	E

Please note the illnesses, injuries, or ailments which affected your morale or resistance to exploitation. Rate the degree that such troubled you by scaling between 1 for high and 6 for low. Use "0" if you were not bothered by a listed physical problem.

- A. 0 (Not bothered)
- B. 1 (Very great difficulty)
- C. 2 (Great difficulty)
- D. 3 (Difficulty)
- E. 4 (Some difficulty)
- F. 5 (Slight difficulty)
- G. 6 (Very slight difficulty)

For each item, decide if you were troubled by that physical problem while in captivity. If you experienced great difficulty, mark "B." If you experienced lesser problems, use the other letters depending upon the severity of your problems.

82. () Stomach distress or indigestion

83. () Ulcers

84. () Fungus

85. () Intestinal parasites

86. () Toothache or abscess

87. () Allergies

88. () Lacerations

89. () Burns

90. () Fractures

91. () Dysentery

92. () Respiratory ailments

93. () Other (specify): _____

What was your attitude or disposition on your last mission just before being captured?

94. Decisive A B C D E F Indecisive

95. Aggressive A B C D E F Cautious

96. "Ready" A B C D E F "Non-ready"

97. Excited A B C D E F Bored

98. Unsuperstitious	A	B	C	D	E	F	Superstitious
99. Fearless	A	B	C	D	E	F	Fearful

On your final mission just before capture, were you:

	<u>Not at All</u>	<u>A Little</u>	<u>Somewhat</u>	<u>Quit a Bit</u>	<u>Very</u>
100. <u>Worried</u> about your family?	A	B	C	D	E
101. <u>Happy</u> with your flight leader (or C.O.)?	A	B	C	D	E
102. <u>In agreement</u> with the tactics used on your mission?	A	B	C	D	E
103. <u>Convinced</u> of the importance of your mission?	A	B	C	D	E
104. <u>In agreement</u> with U.S. war objectives?	A	B	C	D	E
105. <u>Worried</u> about your future or career?	A	B	C	D	E
106. Under the influence of alcohol or drugs?	A	B	C	D	E
107. Certain of the effectiveness of your aircraft or weapons?	A	B	C	D	E

If you knew most of what you now realize about captivity, before you entered combat, would that knowledge have:

	<u>Definitely Not</u>	<u>Probably Not</u>	<u>Possibly Not</u>	<u>Possibly Would Have</u>	<u>Probably Would Have</u>	<u>Definitely Would Have</u>
108. Given you confidence?	A	B	C	D	E	F
109. Made you fearful of combat?	A	B	C	D	E	F
110. Made you more cautious?	A	B	C	D	E	F
111. Stimulate Service "drop out" or requests for release from combat duty?	A	B	C	D	E	F
112. Made you hostile toward a potential captor?	A	B	C	D	E	F

	<u>Defi- nitely Not</u>	<u>Prob- ably Not</u>	<u>Possi- bly Not</u>	<u>Possibly Would Have</u>	<u>Probably Would Have</u>	<u>Definitely Would Have</u>
113. Given you under- standings of yourself?	A	B	C	D	E	F
114. Enabled you to handle the situation?	A	B	C	D	E	F

What changes were caused by captivity upon your attitude towards:

SCALE:

- A. Significant change for the better.
- B. Considerable change for the better
- C. Little change for the better
- D. No change
- E. Little change for the worse
- F. Considerable change for the worse
- G. Significant change for the worse

- 115. () Marriage
- 116. () Family
- 117. () Parents
- 118. () Political views
- 119. () Career
- 120. () Ethical/moral values
- 121. () Patriotism
- 122. (() The Code of Conduct
- 123. () Warfare
- 124. () Asians
- 125. () U.S. way of life
- 126. Should future returned PWs be accorded special consideration in assignments, benefits, promotion and education?
 - A. Always
 - B. In most cases
 - C. Sometimes
 - D. Rarely
 - E. In few cases
 - F. Never

What was your overall reaction to PW leaders?

127. Forceful	A	B	C	D	E	F	Timid
128. Cooperative with PWs	A	B	C	D	E	F	Uncooperative with PWs
129. Articulate	A	B	C	D	E	F	Inarticulate
130. Calm	A	B	C	D	E	F	Agitated
131. Precise	A	B	C	D	E	F	Imprecise
132. Reasonable	A	B	C	D	E	F	Unreasonable
133. Egotistic	A	B	D	D	E	F	Humble

How did you feel about leadership generally?

134. Effective	A	B	C	D	E	F	Ineffective
135. Consistent	A	B	C	D	E	F	Inconsistent
136. Democratic	A	B	C	D	E	F	Undemocratic
137. Inspiring	A	B	C	D	E	F	Uninspiring
138. Decisive	A	B	C	D	E	F	Indecisive
139. Active	A	B	C	D	E	F	Passive
140. Resistance prone	A	B	C	D	E	F	Resistance avoiding

Section G

To be completed by everyone.

1. Using a new answer sheet, mark response "G" opposite item 1.

What effect did the following have upon your physical and mental (morale) well-being as a captive?

	<u>Major Nega- tive Effect</u>	<u>Minor Nega- tive Effect</u>	<u>No Effect</u>	<u>Minor Posi- tive Effect</u>	<u>Major Posi- tive Effect</u>	<u>Essential to Well-being</u>
2. Extra or adequate food and liquid	A	B	C	D	E	F
3. Sunshine and light	A	B	C	D	E	F
4. Relief from heat or cold	A	B	C	D	E	F
5. Sanitation and cleanliness (bathing)	A	B	C	D	E	F
6. Sleep and rest	A	B	C	D	E	F
7. Medical care	A	B	C	D	E	F
8. Living space	A	B	C	D	E	F
9. Relief from pain	A	B	C	D	E	F
10. Good health	A	B	C	D	E	F
11. Work (garden tending, coal balls, etc.)	A	B	C	D	E	F

What effect did recreation have upon your physical and mental well-being (morale) as a PW?

	<u>Major Nega- tive Effect</u>	<u>Minor Nega- tive Effect</u>	<u>No Effect</u>	<u>Minor Posi- tive Effect</u>	<u>Major Posi- tive Effect</u>	<u>Essential to Well-being</u>
12. Exercise and sports	A	B	C	D	E	F
13. Games	A	B	C	D	E	F
14. Skits and plays	A	B	C	D	E	F
15. Mischief, frivolity, jokes	A	B	C	D	E	F

What effect did the following activities have upon your physical or mental well-being (morale)?

	<u>Major Nega- tive Effect</u>	<u>Minor Nega- tive Effect</u>	<u>No Effect</u>	<u>Minor Posi- tive Effect</u>	<u>Major Posi- tive Effect</u>	<u>Essential to Well-being</u>
16. Doing things with your hands	A	B	C	D	E	F
17. Films	A	B	C	D	E	F
18. Broadcasts	A	B	C	D	E	F
19. Oriental music and sounds	A	B	C	D	E	F
20. Western music and sounds	A	B	C	D	E	F
21. Holiday celebrations	A	B	C	D	E	F
22. Visits outside camp	A	B	C	D	E	F

How did the following affect your mental well-being (morale)?

	<u>Major Nega- tive Effect</u>	<u>Minor Nega- tive Effect</u>	<u>No Effect</u>	<u>Minor Posi- tive Effect</u>	<u>Major Posi- tive Effect</u>	<u>Essential to Well-being</u>
23. Getting letters, packages, photos from U.S.	A	B	C	D	E	F
24. News from U.S. or outside camp	A	B	C	D	E	F
25. Good news about the U.S. or the war	A	B	C	D	E	F
26. Bad news about the captor	A	B	C	D	E	F
27. Resumption of bombing	A	B	C	D	E	F
28. Seeing American visitors	A	B	C	D	E	F
29. Contemplation of release	A	B	C	D	E	F
30. Visiting with foreign press	A	B	C	D	E	F
31. Thoughts of family or friends	A	B	C	D	E	F
32. Thoughts of comforts of home	A	B	C	D	E	F
33. Plans for future life	A	B	C	D	E	F

	<u>Major Nega- tive Effect</u>	<u>Minor Nega- tive Effect</u>	<u>No Effect</u>	<u>Minor Posi- tive Effect</u>	<u>Major Posi- tive Effect</u>	<u>Essential to Well-being</u>
34. Touch, embrace, handshake	A	B	C	D	E	F
35. Bright colors	A	B	C	D	E	F
36. Daydreaming or preoccupa- tion	A	B	C	D	E	F
37. Escape plans	A	B	C	D	E	F

How did the following events affect your morale?

	<u>Major Nega- tive Effect</u>	<u>Minor Nega- tive Effect</u>	<u>No Effect</u>	<u>Minor Posi- tive Effect</u>	<u>Major Posi- tive Effect</u>	<u>Essential to Well-being</u>
38. Successful resistance (winning)	A	B	C	D	E	F
39. Son Tay raid	A	B	C	D	E	F
40. Ho Chi Minh's death	A	B	C	D	E	F
41. Attempted escapes	A	B	C	D	E	F
42. Tet Offensive 1968	A	B	C	D	E	F
43. December 1972 bombing raids on Hanoi	A	B	C	D	E	F
44. Bombing halts	A	B	C	D	E	F

How did the following relationships with your fellow PWs affect your morale?

	<u>Major Nega- tive Effect</u>	<u>Minor Nega- tive Effect</u>	<u>No Effect</u>	<u>Minor Posi- tive Effect</u>	<u>Major Posi- tive Effect</u>	<u>Essential to Well-being</u>
45. Helping another PW	A	B	C	D	E	F
46. Help from another PW	A	B	C	D	E	F
47. Having roommate(s)	A	B	C	D	E	F
48. Communication with other PW (overt or covert)	A	B	C	D	E	F
49. Guidance from SRO	A	B	C	D	E	F

	<u>Major Nega- tive Effect</u>	<u>Minor Nega- tive Effect</u>	<u>No Effect</u>	<u>Minor Posi- tive Effect</u>	<u>Major Posi- tive Effect</u>	<u>Essential to Well-bein</u>
50. Religious observances	A	B	C	D	E	F
51. Stable organization among PWs	A	B	C	D	E	F
52. Specific guidance on resistance	A	B	C	D	E	F
53. Agreement with fellow PWs	A	B	C	D	E	F

With respect to assistance given PW families by the Department of Defense or the Services, were they:

54. Effective	A	B	C	D	E	F	Ineffective
55. Comforting	A	B	C	D	E	F	Discomforting
56. Useful	A	B	C	D	E	F	Useless
57. Too much	A	B	C	D	E	F	Too little
58. Appreciated	A	B	C	D	E	F	Unappreciated

Of what importance were the following categories in assisting the PW families?

	<u>Very Unimportant</u>	<u>Neither Important Nor Unimportant</u>	<u>Somewhat Important</u>	<u>Important</u>	<u>Very Important</u>
59. Legal aid	A	B	C	D	E
60. Financial aid	A	B	C	D	E
61. Family counseling	A	B	C	D	E
62. Medical care	A	B	C	D	E
63. Psychiatric care	A	B	C	D	E
64. Providing news of PWs	A	B	C	D	E
65. Other (specify) _____ _____	A	B	C	D	E

66. Were families well prepared for the initial reunion with returning PWs?

A. Yes B. Probably C. Possibly D. Doubtfully E. No

Answer the following two questions in the space provided and continue with the survey.

What do you feel your family was most realistically prepared for on your return?

What do you feel your family was least realistically prepared for on your initial meeting following repatriation?

Only those who were married at the time they returned from captivity should complete the remaining questions in this section — all others go to Section G.

The following list of statements refer to how you may feel about your initial adjustment and reintegration with your family. Record your feelings by entering the letter (A-F) which best indicates your agreement or disagreement with the statement made. Please read and evaluate all of the statements. If the circumstance does not apply to you (i.e., no children) please enter the letter F.

	<u>Strongly</u> <u>Disagree</u>	<u>Dis-</u> <u>agree</u>	<u>Neither</u> <u>Agree</u> <u>Nor</u> <u>Disagree</u>	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Strongly</u> <u>Agree</u>	<u>Not Ap-</u> <u>plicable</u>
67. The PW separation has changed our relationship for the worse - we can't start where we left off at all	A	B	C	D	E	F
68. Being here with my wife and family has not so much caused problems as it has given me a new enthusiasm for life	A	B	C	D	E	F
69. If it weren't for fear of hurting my wife and/or children, I would leave the family	A	B	C	D	E	F
70. We have quarrels and arguments about a few things but we both care more about the relationship than we do about winning the battle	A	B	C	D	E	F

	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>	<u>Dis- agree</u>	<u>Neither Agree Nor Disagree</u>	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Strongly Agree</u>	<u>Not Ap- plicable</u>
71. My folks and I are close to each other	A	B	C	D	E	F
72. I have some reservations about the way my wife handled the finances while I was away	A	B	C	D	E	F
73. We are presently considering divorce or separation	A	B	C	D	E	F
74. The military took good care of my family while I was away	A	B	C	D	E	F
75. We don't discuss my captivity experiences	A	B	C	D	E	F
76. My wife has no real understanding of what I have been through	A	B	C	D	E	F
77. How my wife conducted herself while I was away has been a problem area for me	A	B	C	D	E	F
78. Since my return, we have been faced with legal difficulties	A	B	C	D	E	F
79. The child(ren) is/are a source of irritation for me	A	B	C	D	E	F
80. The family has changed in so many ways; I wonder if I can ever fit in again	A	B	C	D	E	F
81. The kids need firmer discipline than they had while I was away	A	B	C	D	E	F
82. I am pleased with the way my child(ren) was/were raised while I was away	A	B	C	D	E	F
83. I am pleased with my child(ren)'s development	A	B	C	D	E	F
84. I want to maintain close contacts with other returnees	A	B	C	D	E	F

	<u>Strongly</u> <u>Disagree</u>	<u>Dis-</u> <u>agree</u>	<u>Neither</u> <u>Agree</u> <u>Nor</u> <u>Disagree</u>	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Strongly</u> <u>Agree</u>	<u>Not Ap-</u> <u>plicable</u>
85. One of our family difficulties is that the housework is poorly organized and there's no order to the way things are run	A	B	C	D	E	F
86. While I was away, there was conflict between my wife and my parents	A	B	C	D	E	F
87. My wife has paid more attention to the children than to me	A	B	C	D	E	F
88. The family will go along with whatever job or assignment I desire or have already chosen	A	B	C	D	E	F
89. I have found it difficult to explain to others what my experience was really like	A	B	C	D	E	F
90. I feel as if my life today is meaningful	A	B	C	D	E	F
91. I was overburdened with requests for public appearances and found it difficult to say no	A	B	C	D	E	F
92. The void which existed while I was separated from my family is filled now and I once again feel like a complete person	A	B	C	D	E	F
93. I once again feel at home with my wife as if we were old companions	A	B	C	D	E	F
94. I don't think anyone could possibly be happier than my wife and I are with one another	A	B	C	D	E	F
95. I wouldn't say our family reunion was a total success; we still have many things to work through	A	B	C	D	E	F
96. My wife has been running the home for so long that it is difficult for me to take over again	A	B	C	D	E	F

	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>	<u>Dis- agree</u>	<u>Neither Agree Nor Disagree</u>	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Strongly Agree</u>	<u>Not Ap- plicable</u>
97. The child(ren) initially reacted "cooly" towards me; however, we are getting to know each other now.	A	B	C	D	E	F
98. Getting to know your child(ren) again is very difficult and requires patience	A	B	C	D	E	F
99. I feel close to my in-laws	A	B	C	D	E	F
100. We had considered divorce or separation, but have since dropped the idea	A	B	C	D	E	F
101. My wife and I are still strangers living in separate worlds	A	B	C	D	E	F
102. My wife and I are open in our communication	A	B	C	D	E	F
103. When we have conflicts at home, I am more inclined to leave it alone until all cools down	A	B	C	D	E	F
104. I want to shrug off the POW label and get on to being myself	A	B	C	D	E	F
105. I do not feel that I fit in with American society today	A	B	C	D	E	F
106. The sacrifices that I was called upon to make in captivity were worthwhile	A	B	C	D	E	F
107. It has been difficult getting back to the routine of work	A	B	C	D	E	F

	<u>Strongly</u> <u>Disagree</u>	<u>Dis-</u> <u>agree</u>	<u>Neither</u> <u>Agree</u> <u>Nor</u> <u>Disagree</u>	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Strongly</u> <u>Agree</u>	<u>Not Ap-</u> <u>plicable</u>
108. I'm again beginning to be able to predict my wife's reactions, her moods and joys	A	B	C	D	E	F
109. My family recognizes my need to be alone at times and doesn't seem to mind	A	B	C	D	E	F
110. The military's family assistance officers (FSAO, CACO, etc.) were helpful to my family while I was away	A	B	C	D	E	F
111. <u>Before captivity</u> my family and I were very close to each other	A	B	C	D	E	F
112. Our marriage is stronger now than ever	A	B	C	D	E	F
113. I am very sensitive and very easily upset	A	B	C	D	E	F
114. It has taken me quite a while to get to know my family; I still have to work at it	A	B	C	D	E	F
115. My wife appears and acts differently now, but I am adjusting to it	A	B	C	D	E	F
116. We have a division of labor worked out and are each supreme in our spheres	A	B	C	D	E	F
117. Since my return I have had difficulty sleeping, or relaxing	A	B	C	D	E	F
118. I need alot of time alone, to think things through	A	B	C	D	E	F
119. My reunion with my wife at time of Homecoming was not as comforting as I had expected	A	B	C	D	E	F

	<u>Strongly</u> <u>Disagree</u>	<u>Dis-</u> <u>agree</u>	<u>Neither</u> <u>Agree</u> <u>Nor</u> <u>Disagree</u>	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Strongly</u> <u>Agree</u>	<u>Not Ap-</u> <u>plicable</u>
120. I find my friends mean more to me than my family since I've been back, because my friends understand me	A	B	C	D	E	F
121. The child(ren) seem(s) to accept me in the home again	A	B	C	D	E	F
122. I feel my in-laws were supportive of my wife while I was away	A	B	C	D	E	F
123. I feel my parent(s) were supportive of my wife while I was away	A	B	C	D	E	F
124. I find myself more patient with my family than I had been before my last tour to Southeast Asia	A	B	C	D	E	F
125. My family had difficulty understanding my participation in speaking engagements, public appearance, etc. We got into arguments about this	A	B	C	D	E	F
126. Concerning the views of the majority of PWs while in captivity toward the peace movement, I	A	B	C	D	E	F
127. Concerning my wife's (family's) view of the peace movement, we	A	B	C	D	E	F

Section H

To be completed by everyone.

1. Using a new answer sheet, mark response "H" opposite item 1.

With respect to the cultural aspects of your experience in captivity did you:

	<u>A Great Deal</u>	<u>Some</u>	<u>Little</u>	<u>None</u>
2. Have an appreciation of cultural differences between yourself and your captor prior to capture?	A	B	C	D
3. Understand the conventions of courtesy or practice of your captor?	A	B	C	D
4. Know that some "strange" customs of your captor were normal for them?	A	B	C	D
5. Feel that using chopsticks or casual bowing might have helped you avoid conflict with your captor?	A	B	C	D
6. Develop any rapport with your captor?	A	B	C	D
7. <u>Share</u> any small experiences with your captor which reduced tension?	A	B	C	D

How would you characterize the relationship with your captors?

8. Tolerable	A	B	C	D	E	F	Intolerable
9. Satisfactory	A	B	C	D	E	F	Unsatisfactory
10. Understanding	A	B	C	D	E	F	Misunderstanding
11. Forgiving	A	B	C	D	E	F	Unforgiving

How did you relate with your captor in terms of behavior or posture?

12. Relaxed	A	B	C	D	E	F	Tense
13. Non-military	A	B	C	D	E	F	Military
14. Casual	A	B	C	D	E	F	Formal
15. Changing	A	B	C	D	E	F	Unchanging

How do you feel about your captor as a person?

16. Intelligent	A	B	C	D	E	F	Stupid
17. Skillful	A	B	C	D	E	F	Unskillful
18. Sophisticated	A	B	C	D	E	F	Unsophisticated
19. Informed	A	B	C	D	E	F	Uninformed
20. Assured	A	B	C	D	E	F	Timid
21. Energetic	A	B	C	D	E	F	Lazy

Based upon your personal experience, how do you feel your captor generally reacted toward you?

22. Friendly	A	B	C	D	E	F	Unfriendly
23. Honestly	A	B	C	D	E	F	Dishonestly
24. Considerately	A	B	C	D	E	F	Inconsiderately
25. Predictably	A	B	C	D	E	F	Unpredictably
26. Aggressively	A	B	C	D	E	F	Passively
27. Rationally	A	B	C	D	E	F	Irrationally
28. Decisively	A	B	C	D	E	F	Indecisively

Were the captors?

29. Tolerant	A	B	C	D	E	F	Intolerant
30. Loyal	A	B	C	D	E	F	Disloyal
31. Clean	A	B	C	D	E	F	Dirty
32. Courageous	A	B	C	D	E	F	Cowardly
33. Practical	A	B	C	D	E	F	Impractical
34. Bad mannered	A	B	C	D	E	F	Good mannered
35. Patriotic	A	B	C	D	E	F	Unpatriotic
36. Quick witted	A	B	C	D	E	F	Dull

Do you feel the captors were:

37. Intelligent	A	B	C	D	E	F	Stupid
38. Attractive	A	B	C	D	E	F	Ugly
39. Cultured	A	B	C	D	E	F	Uncultured
40. Superior	A	B	C	D	E	F	Inferior
41. Educated	A	B	C	D	E	F	Uneducated
42. Questioning	A	B	C	D	E	F	Accepting
43. Serious	A	B	C	D	E	F	Frivolous
44. Religious	A	B	C	D	E	F	Unreligious
45. Moral	A	B	C	D	E	F	Immoral

From your experience did you find your captors to be:

46. Unexcitable	A	B	C	D	E	F	Excitable
47. Group oriented	A	B	C	D	E	F	Self oriented
48. Polite	A	B	C	D	E	F	Impolite
49. Having humor	A	B	C	D	E	F	Humorless
50. Realistic	A	B	C	D	E	F	Unrealistic
51. Flexible	A	B	C	D	E	F	Inflexible
52. Perceptive	A	B	C	D	E	F	Unperceptive

Characterize the relationship with your fellow PWs:

53. Satisfactory	A	B	C	D	E	F	Unsatisfactory
54. Forgiving	A	B	C	D	E	F	Unforgiving
55. Tolerable	A	B	C	D	E	F	Intolerable
56. Understanding	A	B	C	D	E	F	Misunderstanding

How did you relate with your fellow PWs in terms of behavior or posture?

- | | | | | | | | |
|------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|------------|
| 57. Casual | A | B | C | D | E | F | Formal |
| 58. Relaxed | A | B | C | D | E | F | Tense |
| 59. Changing | A | B | C | D | E | F | Unchanging |
| 60. Non-military | A | B | C | D | E | F | Military |

How do you feel about your fellow PW as a person?

- | | | | | | | | |
|-------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|-----------------|
| 61. Intelligent | A | B | C | D | E | F | Stupid |
| 62. Assured | A | B | C | D | E | F | Timid |
| 63. Skillful | A | B | C | D | E | F | Unskillful |
| 64. Energetic | A | B | C | D | E | F | Lazy |
| 65. Informed | A | B | C | D | E | F | Uninformed |
| 66. Sophisticated | A | B | C | D | E | F | Unsophisticated |

Based upon your personal experience, how do you feel your fellow PWs generally reacted toward you?

- | | | | | | | | |
|-------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|-----------------|
| 67. Considerately | A | B | C | D | E | F | Inconsiderately |
| 68. Rationally | A | B | C | D | E | F | Irrationally |
| 69. Honestly | A | B | C | D | E | F | Dishonestly |
| 70. Predictably | A | B | C | D | E | F | Unpredictably |
| 71. Friendly | A | B | C | D | E | F | Unfriendly |
| 72. Agressively | A | B | C | D | E | F | Passively |
| 73. Decisively | A | B | C | D | E | F | Indecisively |

Were your fellow PWs?

74. Patriotic	A	B	C	D	E	F	Unpatriotic
75. Courageous	A	B	C	D	E	F	Cowardly
76. Bad mannered	A	B	C	D	E	F	Good mannered
77. Tolerant	A	B	C	D	E	F	Intolerant
78. Loyal	A	B	C	D	E	F	Disloyal
79. Quick witted	A	B	C	D	E	F	Dull
80. Clean	A	B	C	D	E	F	Dirty
81. Practical	A	B	C	D	E	F	Impractical

Do you feel your fellow PWs were:

82. Religious	A	B	C	D	E	F	Unreligious
83. Serious	A	B	C	D	E	F	Frivolous
84. Cultured	A	B	C	D	E	F	Uncultured
85. Superior	A	B	C	D	E	F	Inferior
86. Moral	A	B	C	D	E	F	Immoral
87. Educated	A	B	C	D	E	F	Uneducated
88. Questioning	A	B	C	D	E	F	Accepting
89. Attractive	A	B	C	D	E	F	Ugly
90. Intelligent	A	B	C	D	E	F	Stupid

From your experience, did you find your fellow PWs to be:

- | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---------------|
| 91. Realistic | A | B | C | D | E | F | Unrealistic |
| 92. Perceptive | A | B | C | D | E | F | Unperceptive |
| 93. Having humor | A | B | C | D | E | F | Humorless |
| 94. Polite | A | B | C | D | E | F | Impolite |
| 95. Flexible | A | B | C | D | E | F | Inflexible |
| 96. Unexcitable | A | B | C | D | E | F | Excitable |
| 97. Group oriented | A | B | C | D | E | F | Self oriented |
98. To what degree do you think your characterizations of PWs apply to the American people generally?
- A. Not at all
 - B. To a small degree
 - C. Somewhat
 - D. To a major degree
 - E. Completely

The utmost gratitude of all who work to accurately report and analyze your recent captivity experience is offered for your participation and cooperation in this survey.

END

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